University of Vermont

UVM ScholarWorks
Graduate College Dissertations and Theses

Dissertations and Theses

2015

Working in Utopia: Locating Marx's "Realm of Necessity" in the
Socialist Futures of Bellamy and Morris
Kira Braham
University of Vermont

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uvm.edu/graddis
Part of the American Literature Commons, English Language and Literature Commons, and the Labor
Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Braham, Kira, "Working in Utopia: Locating Marx's "Realm of Necessity" in the Socialist Futures of Bellamy
and Morris" (2015). Graduate College Dissertations and Theses. 507.
https://scholarworks.uvm.edu/graddis/507

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at UVM ScholarWorks. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate College Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of
UVM ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@uvm.edu.

WORKING IN UTOPIA: LOCATING MARX’S “REALM OF NECESSITY” IN THE
SOCIALIST FUTURES OF BELLAMY AND MORRIS

A Thesis Presented
by
Kira Braham
to
The Faculty of the Graduate College
of
The University of Vermont

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Master of Arts in English
Specializing in English
May, 2015

Defense Date: March 24, 2015
Thesis Committee:
Sarah Alexander, Ph.D., Advisor
Todd McGowan, Ph.D.
Dona Brown, Ph.D.
Cynthia J. Forehand, Ph.D., Dean of the Graduate College

ABSTRACT
This project examines two works of nineteenth-century utopian fiction, Edward
Bellamy’s Looking Backward and William Morris’s News from Nowhere, and considers
the way in which the organization of work in these imagined post-capitalist futures is
guided by their respective philosophies of labor: while Bellamy’s utopia is structured by
an understanding of labor as primarily a social duty, Morris presents labor as central to
the full development and happiness of the individual. These two utopias are read as
representative of a fundamental tension within the writings of Marx: while Morris’s
understanding of labor aligns with the early works of Marx, Bellamy’s vision is an
expression of later attempts by Marx to distinguish between productive activity
performed in the “realm of necessity” and that performed in the “realm of freedom.” This
project identifies in Bellamy’s utopia a continued presence of alienated labor and reads
this limitation as the inevitable outcome of an attempt to realize Marx’s distinction
between necessary and free production; Morris’s ability to eradicate alienated labor in
his utopia is thus only possible because he abandons this distinction and recognizes, as
did the early Marx, the centrality of all forms of production to the individual’s realization
of her creative human essence. However, while Morris overcomes alienation, his attempt
to break with the material foundations of capitalism leaves his utopia unsustainable; this
project therefore looks to Bellamy’s economic structures in an attempt to imagine how
Morris’s labor philosophy might be infused with Bellamy’s structural elements to create
a socialist future which would grow from the material conditions of capitalism while
fully separating itself from the alienation of capitalist labor relations.
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INTRODUCTION
Marx was skeptical of the political efficacy of utopian thinking. In The
Communist Manifesto, he critiques utopian socialists like Henri Saint-Simon, Charles
Fourier, and Robert Owen for their inability to understand the role of historical forces and
class antagonism in bringing about social change. For Marx, their “fantastic pictures of
future society,” while revolutionary in their thinking, lose “all practical value” once the
proletariat begins to realize itself as a class and engage in concrete political action (255).
However, Marx’s critique here cannot be understood as an indictment against envisioning
a post-capitalist future; in fact, he argues that utopian texts have intrinsic value as critical
works: because their radically alternative visions of society serve to “attack every
principle of existing society,” they are “full of the most valuable materials for the
enlightenment of the working class” (255). For Marx, utopian thinking becomes a
detriment only when it is considered as the equivalent of or alternative to immediate
political action; Marx lauds future visions for their ability to act as a critical lens that
could motivate and supplement “practical” activity. While Marx himself never produced
a systematic utopian vision, he constantly interwove glimpses of the post-capitalist future
with his analysis of the current system. It is in these moments, in which Marx provides
visions of a world beyond capitalism, that the ultimate aim of the political action he
advocates becomes most clear. As I argue in this thesis, the anticipatory moments of
Marx’s work all point towards “a society in which the full and free development of the
individual forms the ruling principle” (Capital V. 1 739). However, an examination of
these moments, while revealing continuity of purpose, also reveals a discontinuity in
Marx’s work concerning the way in which this full and free development would be
achieved in a future society. I will establish that this discontinuity is the result of a
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significant change in Marx’s philosophical understanding of the role of labor. While in
his earlier works, Marx understands labor to be a necessary aspect of the individual’s full
and free development, his later works distinguish socially necessary acts of labor from
free individual activity, creating a condition in which labor becomes a foundation, as
opposed to an active component, of this development.
Understanding this discontinuity is important for those interested in the
continuing relevance of Marx’s political project: because this shift in Marx’s philosophy
produces practical differences in the end goal of social change, any movement towards
this type of change must choose a direction. One path allows for a continuance of the
basic distinction between work and free time that structures society under the capitalist
system, while the other would require a fundamental break with this distinction. In this
project, I will examine two socialist utopias, Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward and
William Morris’s News from Nowhere, as respective representations of these two
disparate paths with the intention of better understanding both the potential and the
limitations of Marx’s theories through their application in these imagined futures: I will
be employing these utopias as a critical lens, as Marx imagined, but I will be turning that
lens not on the capitalist system, but on Marx himself. My project will not be solely
critical in its function, however. In considering the way in which Marx’s own ideas
concerning the post-capitalist future are expressed in the systematic form of the utopian
novel, his brief glimpses can be examined as holistic visions that may act, not as political
programs in themselves, but as “an indication of the kind of place it is worth desiring”
(Dentith 149). As Frederic Jameson argues in his classic essay, “The Politics of Utopia,”
it is “difficult […] to imagine any radical political programme today without the
2

conception of a systemic otherness, of an alternative society, which only the idea of
utopia seems to keep alive” (36).
Before I begin to examine the novels themselves, I will outline my understanding
of both the way in which Marx’s focus on the development of the individual remains
consistent throughout his works, as well as the way in which his view of labor in relation
to this development undergoes a fundamental change. The question of rupture versus
continuity in Marx’s thought is one that has been discussed heatedly since the publication
in the twentieth century of previously unpublished writings composed early in his career.
These works proposed the presence of a human essence or inherent human nature that
some Marxists found incompatible with the materialist doctrines of his later works. The
argument for the presence of a decisive rupture in Marx’s thinking is still most notably
embodied by Louis Althusser, whose proposal of the “epistemological break” in the
1960s continues to structure debates within Marxist studies. For Althusser, Marx’s body
of work can be divided into two distinct periods: the ideological and the scientific (34).
He contends that Marx’s “Early Works,” those written prior to 1845, were a reaction to
his historical conditions: as a young philosopher in nineteenth-century Germany, it was
inevitable that he should have responded to Hegel. Thus, Marx’s early work, particularly
the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, in which “the essence of man is
the basis for all history and politics,” is an attempt to reconcile the idealism of Hegel with
real material conditions (226). Althusser’s conception of the epistemological break is
based on his assertion that the mature Marx broke fully from this connection to Hegel,
abandoning the aim of establishing a humanist philosophy that addressed a universal
vision of man; moreover, this break was not incidental, but was of primary importance to
3

what Althusser views as Marx’s most meaningful contributions. Marx’s primary
“scientific discovery,” was, for Althusser, the establishment of what he terms Marx’s
“theoretical anti-humanism,” which is founded on the understanding that “it is impossible
to know anything about men except on the absolute precondition that the philosophical
(theoretical) myth of man is reduced to ashes” (229, my emphasis). Thus, the theoretical
foundations of Capital and other “Mature Works,” e.g. “the concepts of mode of
production, forces of production, relations of production, superstructure, ideology, etc.,”
are necessarily predicated on the belief that humanity can be understood not in terms of a
universal essence, but only as an “ensemble of social relations” (243-4).
For Althusser, then, Marx’s relationship to philosophical humanism is to be
considered a youthful dalliance, an affair necessary for the formation of the mature man,
but one that must be wholly disregarded once he is wed to historical materialism. For
other thinkers, however, the exact opposite is true: humanism is Marx’s lasting
companion, the ideal to which he is faithful through every tempestuous theoretical
development. One of the most eloquent advocates of this position remains Erich Fromm,
a contemporary of Althusser, whose Marx’s Concept of Man contained, in addition to his
own writings on Marx, the first publication in the United States of the Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts in its entirety. This work, which Althusser calls “the Marx
furthest from Marx” (159), is, for Fromm, the key to understanding the entire body of
Marx’s work. Contrary to Althusser, Fromm contends that “ it is impossible to
understand his [Marx’s] concept of socialism, and his criticism of capitalism as
developed in his later years, except on the basis of the concept of man which he
developed in his early writings” (79). For Fromm, Marx’s aim remained throughout this
4

career “the spiritual emancipation of man” (3), and the early works, particularly the
Manuscripts, contain the most significant elaboration of what this emancipation would
entail. Like Althusser, Fromm recognizes Marx’s philosophical debt to Hegel,
particularly in the former’s focus on alienation: “For Marx, as for Hegel, the concept of
alienation is based on the distinction between existence and essence, on the fact that
man’s existence is alienated from his essence, that in reality he is not what he potentially
is, or, to put it differently, that he is not what he ought to be, and that he ought to be that
which he could be” (47). As Fromm goes on to explain, this alienation of human essence
from human existence is a product of labor relations and thus forms Marx’s primary
critique of capitalism, the system which creates these alienating labor conditions. In the
Manuscripts, as Fromm argues, Marx establishes that what constitutes the human essence
is the interaction of man with nature through the process of labor; for Marx, “Labor is the
self-expression of man, an expression of his individual physical and mental powers. In
this process of genuine activity, man develops himself, becomes himself; work is not
only a means to an end—the product—but an end in itself, the meaningful expression of
human energy” (41-2). Thus, what man could be, what he ought to be, is a free producer,
a being who has control over his own labor, the fundamental means by which he realizes
and expresses his humanity.
The Marx of the Manuscripts did certainly present a universal vision of humanity
that is predicated upon the individual’s relationship to labor. He states, “The whole
character of a species, its species-character, resides in the nature of its life activity, and
free conscious activity constitutes the species-character of man” (328). For Marx, this
“free conscious activity” takes the form of production and labor:
5

The practical creation of an objective world, the fashioning of inorganic
nature, is proof that man is a conscious species-being […] It is therefore in
his fashioning of the objective that man really proves himself to be a
species-being. Such production is his active species-life […] The object of
labor is therefore the objectification of the species-life of man: for man
reproduces himself not only intellectually, in his consciousness, but
actively and actually, and he can therefore contemplate himself in the
world he himself has created. (329)
For Marx, the human essence, the species-being, is expressed through the individual’s
relationship to labor. Through labor, this fashioning of nature, the individual recognizes
herself as an integral and active part of the world in which she exists; her consciousness,
her individuality, is shaped by the way in which she sees herself reflected back in the
objective world around her that she has helped to create. Labor, as man’s fundamental
“life-activity” is not just about the object created but is an end in itself; it is in the act of
free conscious production that the individual becomes species-being.
Since Marx’s humanism is thus predicated upon man’s relationship to labor, the
question of whether or not his philosophical origins continue to inform his work must be
based on the way in which he presents this relationship throughout his career. Thus, when
Fromm argues that “the core of the philosophy developed by the young Marx was never
changed” (79), he is arguing that Marx remained committed to a vision of labor as the
basis for the full development of the individual as species-being. In support of his claim
for philosophical continuity in Marx, Fromm discusses the following famous passage
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from Capital Volume Three, in which Marx lays out what is perhaps his most
comprehensive vision of labor organization in a socialist society:
The realm of freedom really begins where labour determined by necessity
and external expediency ends; it lies by its very nature beyond the sphere
of material production proper […] Freedom, in this sphere, can consist
only in this, that socialized man, the associated producers, govern the
human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their
collective control […]; accomplishing it with the least expenditure of
energy and in conditions most worthy and appropriate for their human
nature. But this always remains a realm of necessity. The true realm of
freedom, the development of human powers as an end in itself, begins
beyond it. (959, my emphasis)
For Fromm, this passage is the height of Marx’s humanism, the end of the alienation that
formed the basis of his critique of capitalism. He contends that in this “new form of
unalienated society,” man “would no longer be crippled by the alienated mode of
production and consumption; that he would truly be the master and creator of his own
life, and hence that he could begin to make living his main business, rather than
producing the means for living” (60).
There does indeed seem to be a fundamental continuity here between the Marx of
the Manuscripts and the Marx of Capital: the universalist language of this passage—
human nature, human powers—suggests the kind of philosophical humanism that
Althusser was convinced Marx had broken with entirely; this is the presentation of a
system whose ultimate purpose is the full and free development of the human essence.
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However, the nature of this continuity, as Fromm presents it, contains a glaring
contradiction. As Fromm rightly points out, this passage from Capital does present a
society in which there is a sharp distinction between “living” and “producing the means
for living;” in this vision put forth by the later Marx, the true expression of the human
essence can occur only outside the realm of necessary production. Thus, labor that is
performed for the meeting of material needs is placed in contradistinction to human life
activity. While Fromm argues that there is no significant philosophical break between the
early and the late Marx, his own evaluation of the Manuscripts suggests otherwise. As he
says, labor, in this and other early works, is presented by Marx as an “end-in-itself;” it is
the “self-expression of man.” In short, for the early Marx, labor is life-activity—
producing the means for living is life itself, not something that occurs before living can
properly begin. In the Manuscripts, Marx identifies as one of the primary sources of
alienation in the capitalist system the fact that labor, for the worker, becomes “not the
satisfaction of a need but a mere means to satisfy needs outside itself” (326). In Marx’s
vision in Capital, there is an entire realm of human production, labor performed in the
realm of necessity, that is to serve only as a means to an end.
I would thus like to propose a reading of Marx that lies somewhere between
Althusser’s conception of the epistemological break and Fromm’s assertion of complete
philosophical continuity. While Marx continued throughout his career to base his visions
of a socialist society on the conception of a human essence that should be allowed to
flourish in each individual, his understanding of the role of labor in this process of human
emancipation underwent a significant shift. In his early works, Marx presents all
unalienated labor as part of the free conscious production that defines man as a species8

being and thus establishes for labor a fundamental role in the full development of the
humanity of the individual. However, in his later writings, the development of the human
essence becomes severed from material production, culminating in his insistence in
Capital Volume Three that labor performed in the realm of necessity must, by definition,
serve only as the precondition, and not as the means, of fundamental human expression.
Recognizing the continued presence of the human essence in Marx’s work is vital to any
understanding of the end goal of Marx’s political project: Althusser’s reading of the
“scientific” Marx incorrectly divorces his later writings from the moral imperative that
structures his definition of a better society as one in which the essential humanity of
every individual would be realized. Equally as important, however, is the recognition that
Marx presents two different understandings of how the creative and productive human
essence would achieve this realization: in eliding this difference, Fromm avoids the fact
that a fundamental decision concerning the role of labor must be made before any
movement towards this goal of human emancipation can be achieved.
Marx first establishes his notion of labor as formative human activity in the
Manuscripts of 1844, and he carries on and elaborates this understanding in his work of
1845, The German Ideology. In this text, he says that men
begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to
produce their means of subsistence […] This mode of production must not
be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence
of individuals. Rather it is a definite form of expressing their life, a
definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they
are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production. (37)
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In this passage, it is clear that Marx points specifically to production performed for the
satisfaction of material needs as a form of individual human expression; he directly
cautions against viewing necessary production as merely a means of meeting material
needs. As in the Manuscripts, his critique of capitalism in this text is based on the
argument that capitalist production, which alienates the worker from his own labor, has
severed him from his fundamental life-activity; he argues that while the separation of
“self-activity and the production of material life” occurred in earlier periods, it is with
capitalism that “they now diverge to such an extent that material life appears as the end,
and what produces this material life, labour (which is now the only possible but, as we
see, negative form of self-activity), as the means” (96, my emphasis). Because, with the
capitalist division of labor, the worker becomes severed from his own production, and
“man’s own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of
being controlled by him” (53), labor ceases to be self-fulfilling and becomes a “negative
form of self-activity.” For Marx, then, because human expression is tied to production,
the only way in which individuals can “achieve self-activity” is through taking control of
“the existing totality of productive forces”; it is through this appropriation of the
instruments of production that the individual, who is shaped by his own acts of
production, develops his “individual capacities” (96). It is only after this appropriation
has occurred, when man is reunited with his own labor, that “self-activity coincide[s]
with material life, which corresponds to the development of individuals into complete
individuals” (97, my emphasis). Thus, for the Marx of The German Ideology, as for the
Marx of the Manuscripts, the individual is only fully realized as a species-being through
her relationship to labor; it is through labor that her humanity becomes fully-developed.
10

While the message of Marx’s early works is overwhelmingly one that presents all
unalienated labor as formative human activity, there is a moment in the Manuscripts
which seems to suggest that labor performed in the realm of necessity may be
distinguished from truly free human production. In the Manuscripts, Marx establishes the
distinction between animal and human production, and one of these elements is that
animals “produce only when immediate physical need compels them to do so, while man
produces even when he is free from physical need and truly produces only in freedom
from such need” (329, my emphasis). While Marx suggests here that true production only
occurs when man is not concerned with meeting physical needs, I would argue that there
is a significant difference between producing for the sole purpose of physical necessity
and freely creating a product that meets physical needs. For Marx, alienated labor is that
which is “not the satisfaction of a need but a mere means to satisfy needs outside itself”
(326). This “immediate physical need” which Marx defines as driving animal production
would be the equivalent of a human being freezing to death in the wilderness if she does
not immediately produce shelter; however, in the case of a worker commissioned to build
a home for another, the shelter is still a physical necessity, but it is not produced by the
worker out of her own immediate needs but rather to fulfill a social need. If the worker is
fulfilled in her work, performing it freely (without the compulsion to earn her own means
of subsistence), she is performing socially necessary work that also satisfies her own need
to reproduce herself through her labor; thus, the work is not solely a means to an end, but
is also an end in itself. Marx is speaking here of the compulsion of the immediate
physical need of the individual, not of all necessary material production. There is thus no
separate social “realm of necessity” here as there will be for the later Marx.
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Marx does not begin to establish the distinction between the “realm of freedom”
and the “realm of necessity” that will become so central to his vision in Capital Volume
Three until several years later, in 1857-8, when he composed the notebooks which would
later be published as The Grundrisse. Peter Beilharz argues that, in this work, Marx
breaks with “the very labour ontology upon which his early work is based […] The
prospect of freedom, or at least of free time, shifts beyond the sphere of labour or
production into the realm beyond it” (599). The “labour ontology” to which Beilharz
refers here is in line with my own reading of Marx’s early works as presenting labor as
the formative human activity; the break from this vision of labor occurs for Beilharz in
Marx’s discussion of advanced automation as a replacement for direct labor in The
Grundrisse. There are certainly grounds for Beilharz’s reading. In this work, Marx argues
that the advancement of machinery creates a situation in which the individual no longer
relates directly to production through her labor:
Labour no longer appears so much to be included within the production
process; rather, the human being comes to relate more as a watchmen and
regulator to the production process itself […] In this transformation, it is
neither the direct human labour he himself performs, nor the time during
which he works, but rather the appropriation of his own general productive
power, his understanding of nature and his mastery over it by virtue of his
presence as a social body. (284)
Here, the act of material production, previously performed by human labor, is taken over
by machinery. Marx does not lament this transference; instead, it is for him the grounds
for the advancement of society. The worker whose time is no longer monopolized by
12

direct physical labor is freed to fully develop her human capacity: “[T]he general
reduction of the necessary labour time to a minimum” leads to “the artistic, scientific etc.
development of the individuals in the time set free, and with the means created, for all of
them” (285). The freeing of the individual from direct labor, the creation of “disposable
time,” is beneficial not just for the individual but for society as a whole: “The saving of
labour time [is] equal to an increase of free time, i.e. time for the full development of the
individual, which in turn reacts back upon the productive power of labour as itself the
greatest productive power” (290, my emphasis). Thus, Marx does seem to abandon his
earlier “labor ontology” in the sense that he shifts his focus from the development of the
individual through her labor to a focus on what occurs in her “free time”; this free time,
far from being equated with leisure as it is in ordinary parlance, is instead the space in
which the individual actively develops her full creative capacities. This passage from The
Grundrisse does seem to parallel Marx’s insistence in Capital on a division between the
realm of necessity and the realm of freedom. Here, as in Capital, the individual develops
herself as species-being, as a free conscious producer, only after she is freed from direct
labor.
However, there are indications in The Grundrisse that Marx had not yet
committed to a complete break between necessary production and “the development of
human powers as an end in itself” (Capital V.3 959). While the worker of The Grundrisse
no longer relates to material production in the same way, her development is still
intrinsically tied to her labor; it is just that her labor has changed forms. She has become
the “watchmen and regulator” of the process; instead of being herself a tool of
production, she is guiding and shaping it. The machines, freeing her from direct labor,
13

have not divorced her from the material production process entirely but have created a
new role for her, one that allows for a more intellectual, as opposed to physical,
engagement. Thus, when she undergoes her “full development” in her disposable time, it
immediately “reacts back upon the productive power of labour.” She does not develop as
an individual separated from the production process, but as a worker who continues to
contribute to material production. This understanding leads Marx to immediately
compromise the distinction between labor time and free time that he has himself just
established. He explains that once the workers have appropriated their own surplus labor,
thus controlling their own free time (that spent outside of direct production), “disposable
time thereby ceases to have an antithetical existence” (287). As he goes on to clarify,
“direct labour time itself cannot remain in the abstract antithesis to free time in which it
appears from the perspective of bourgeois economy” (290). Because free time is directly
linked to the development of the productive forces of the individual, forces which are
then channeled back into the combined human labor force, the distinction between free
time and labor time becomes inconsequential. The realm of freedom, then, is intertwined
with the realm of necessity: the artistic and scientific work done by the individual in her
“free” time is not distinct from her contributions to material production. Thus, to say, as
Beilharz does, that Marx’s ontology has been divorced from labor and production is not
entirely accurate. While Marx does argue in The Grundrisse that human development
does occur when the individual is, in part, freed from direct labor, he says this with the
understanding that the distinction between direct labor and the creative production
performed outside the realm of necessity cannot truly be made once the worker controls
the means of production.
14

While I do not believe that a fundamental break with Marx’s early philosophy of
labor occurs in The Grundrisse, I believe that he establishes a foundation here for the
break that does occur in Capital. While he has not fully committed in the earlier text to a
break between the realms of necessity and freedom, his understanding here of the role of
automation is parallel to what Marx sees in the latter text as the role of the entity which
he calls the “associated producers” (Capital V.3 959). Both are predicated on the idea that
the worker must in some sense be freed from obligations to the realm of necessity before
she can begin to truly develop as a species-being. However, it is only in Capital that
Marx wholly divorces individual development from necessary material production. It is
the adoption of this distinction that fully severs the labor philosophy of the early Marx
from that of the late Marx; in Capital, socially necessary labor ceases to be formative
life-activity and instead becomes a means to life. Throughout his career, Marx remained
true to a humanist agenda; in the words of Eagleton, for Marx, “there is or should be no
ultimate point to human existence beyond its self-delighting development” (18). As Marx
says in Capital Volume One, the ultimate goal is to create a society in which the “full and
free development of every individual forms the ruling principle” (739). However, while
the agenda remains consistent, Marx’s understanding of what it means to reach this goal
undergoes a fundamental change. While in his early works, this “full and free
development” is inseparable from necessary material production, the Marx of Capital
sees the potential for this development only in the social spaces that exist outside of it.
In my first chapter, I will respond to the common reading of Looking Backward
which sees Bellamy’s utopia as failing to break with the capitalist society in which it was
written; I will argue that Bellamy presents a future that is much more Marxist than
15

capitalist and that the ties that remain with the capitalist present represent not his failure
to move beyond it, but the understanding he shares with Marx of the way in which the
socialist future must employ the large-scale production and socialized labor force brought
into being by industrial capitalism. I will argue that Bellamy, like Marx, imagines a
society whose goal is the “full and free development” of the individual and that
Bellamy’s understanding of how labor functions in the achievement of this goal aligns
with that proposed in the later writings of Marx. My reading of Bellamy’s utopia will
discuss the ways in which his society opens up the possibility of a move beyond alienated
labor, but I will argue that his adoption of Marx’s distinction between the “realm of
necessity” and the “realm of freedom” forecloses this possibility by creating conditions in
which the daily activity of the individual is separated from her “self-delighting
development.” In my second chapter, I will argue that Morris’s socialist vision in News
from Nowhere also takes as its primary goal the “full and free development of the
individual” but aligns, in opposition to Bellamy, with the conception of labor as
fundamental to the development of the individual as a species-being found in Marx’s
early works. I will further argue that in adopting this view, Morris’s utopia actively
deconstructs the distinction between necessary and free production and that it is the
abandonment of this distinction that leads to the eradication of alienated labor in his
imagined future. In my conclusion, I will respond to the work of Darko Suvin, who has
argued that the utopias of Bellamy and Morris are fundamentally compatible. For Suvin,
Bellamy’s utopia represents a “societas rerum” (a society of things) while Morris’s
utopia represents a “societas hominum” (a society of human relations); in short, “each
lacks what the other has” (184-5). I will argue that while Suvin is correct about News
16

from Nowhere, which he claims lacks a strong material foundation, Looking Backward
cannot be understood as a hollow material shell waiting for a philosophy because it is
already strongly informed by one of its own. Thus, any attempt to graft the understanding
of humanity proposed by Morris onto the material conditions proposed by Bellamy would
necessarily include a displacement of Bellamy’s philosophy. I will further argue that
understanding how this displacement might be achieved without abandoning the material
structures of Bellamy’s utopia may be the key to imagining a socialism which would
grow from the material conditions of capitalism while fully separating itself from the
alienation of capitalist labor relations.
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CHAPTER ONE: FULFILLING THE “EDICT OF EDEN” IN LOOKING
BACKWARD
William Morris, in his 1889 review of Looking Backward, critiques Bellamy’s
inability to imagine a future socialist society that is fully severed from the capitalist
present; Bellamy, he argues, is “perfectly satisfied with modern civilization, if only the
injustice, misery, and waste of class society can be got rid of; which half-change seems
possible to him” (354, my emphasis). This reading of Bellamy’s utopia as incomplete in
its transition from capitalism to socialism, as representing only a “half-change,” is one
that is frequently echoed in modern scholarship. Simon Dentith, while acknowledging the
sincerity of Bellamy’s moral commitment to socialism, argues that he fails to imagine a
significant “transformation of human relations” (144). Likewise, Alexander MacDonald
sees Bellamy’s utopia as expressing a “basic acceptance” of capitalist society’s “essential
features” (82), and Matthew Beaumont claims that Bellamy’s vision, while ostensibly
socialist, most closely resembles “a more humane and morally acceptable species of
capitalism” (30). In this chapter, I will argue that Bellamy does imagine a radical
transformation of human relations and that his ties to capitalism represent not a failure to
move beyond it, but a necessary employment of the large-scale production that arose with
capitalism for the creation of a socialist future: in his utopia, Bellamy employs, as Marx
imagined in Capital Volume One, the “new productive power, which is intrinsically a
collective one” (443), which necessarily arises with capitalism, to distinctly socialist
ends. I will argue that Bellamy’s use of an organized collective labor force as a highly
efficient means for meeting the needs of society as a whole aligns with Marx’s vision of a
socialist society at the end of Capital Volume Three and that the shared vision of Bellamy
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and Marx significantly reimagines the human relations of capitalism in its understanding
of cooperation as the foundation of society. I will further argue that Bellamy adopts as the
end goal of his societal transformation the “full and free development” of the individual,
which Marx argues should form the “ruling principle” of any “higher form of society”
(Capital V.1 739). I will align Bellamy’s approach to the achievement of this end with
that found specifically in the later works of Marx, which establish a distinction between
productive activity performed in the “realm of freedom” and that performed in the “realm
of necessity” (Capital V.3 959). An examination of how this distinction manifests itself in
Bellamy’s utopian vision will show that any attempt to relegate necessary material
production to a separate realm inevitably allows for the continuation of alienated labor as
it is defined in the early works of Marx. My purpose in aligning Bellamy’s utopia with
Marx’s writings is thus two-fold. In studying how Bellamy’s vision employs the
productive forces that arose with capitalism, I will highlight the potential for a postcapitalist society to emerge from the material conditions of the present, and in examining
the problems inherent in his creation of a distinct realm of necessity, I will explore the
consequences that arise from a structural divide between individual fulfillment and the
meeting of social needs. In aligning these aspects of Bellamy’s society with the theories
of Marx, I will show both the potential and the limitations of the latter as they may arise
in practical application.
The world of Boston in the year 2000, the stage of Bellamy’s utopian
speculation, is unveiled to the reader through the eyes of its nineteenth-century
protagonist, Julian West. West, a wealthy young Bostonian, enters a mesmeric trance in
the year 1887 and lays undiscovered (through a series of events not relevant to this study)
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until he is found in the year 2000 by the Leete family, not having aged a day due to the
preservative nature of the trance. Upon awakening, he finds himself in a world very
different from the one he left, and it is the Leete family who educate him on the nature of
his surroundings. One of the first things to be elucidated by the family patriarch, Dr.
Leete, is how the world in which West finds himself came to be. As he explains, private
economic enterprise has been eliminated through a process of “industrial evolution” in
which the great monopolies of the nineteenth century were combined into one productive
force:
Early in the last century the evolution was completed by the final
consolidation of the entire capital of the nation. The industry and
commerce of the country, ceasing to be conducted by a set of irresponsible
corporations and syndicates of private persons at their caprice and for their
profit, were intrusted to a single syndicate representing the people, to be
conducted in the common interest for the common profit. The nation, that
is to say, organized as the one great business corporation in which all other
corporations were absorbed; it become the one capitalist in the place of all
the other capitalists […] The epoch of trusts had ended in The Great Trust.
(33)
Bellamy’s language here certainly lends itself to the criticism that his utopia has not
broken with the fundamental elements of capitalism. The concept of the nation as “one
great business corporation” sounds, at first blush, more like an authoritarian right-wing
paradise than a socialist one. Bellamy, in fact, never describes his future society as
socialist; instead, it is the “national party” that facilitates the political change necessary to
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accompany this “industrial evolution.” The transition of the means of production from
private to public ownership was accomplished not by an act of political revolution by the
laboring classes, but by the peaceful action of one unified party that was comprised
“equally of all classes” (149). Scholars like Beaumont and Phillip Wegner are
undoubtedly correct in their assertion that Bellamy was ambivalent toward socialism and
eschewed revolutionary politics. Bellamy himself stated that that word socialism was one
he “could never well stomach,” and that socialism would never be accepted in the United
States because it “smells to the average American of petroleum, suggests the red flag,
with all manner of sexual novelties, and an abusive tone about God and religion”
(Wegner 69). His account in Looking Backward of the way in which his utopian society
comes to be clearly forecloses the possibility of any meaningful change being
accomplished by means of class struggle. As Dr. Leete tells West, “The labor parties, as
such, never could have accomplished anything on a large or permanent scale” (149). It is
only through the mutual recognition by all classes of the need to organize society “on a
higher ethical basis” that a just order is brought into being (149).
Why, then, is Bellamy’s utopia even considered socialist? Why debate whether or
not Bellamy’s utopia achieves a full transition to socialism when that seemingly was not
even its intention? Bellamy himself realized that, even with his aversion to the term
socialism, he seems to “out-socialize the socialists” with his “radicalness of opinions”
(Wegner 69). Furthermore, Bellamy’s novel was widely accepted as a socialist vision. In
fact, as Beaumont shows, many of Looking Backward’s readers interpreted it as “the
socialist bible of reconstruction, a kind of guidebook to post-capitalist society” (28).
Morris, himself an avowed socialist, viewed the popularity of Bellamy’s novel as an
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indication “that there are a great many people who are hopeful in regards to Socialism”
(353). Most importantly, as I will show, despite Bellamy’s choice of language, his vision
of a just society fundamentally aligns with that of Marx; regardless of its intention,
Bellamy’s utopia acts as a proving ground for many of the ideas proposed in Marx’s
works. In short, while Bellamy may have been ambivalent towards socialism as he saw it
enacted in his historical moment, his utopia is structured by its core philosophies and
dictates.
One of Bellamy’s primary objections to socialism was not its end goal, but rather
the way in which that end was achieved. Bellamy’s vision of a seamless transition to a
new social order, enacted by and for the whole of society, is in clear opposition to Marx’s
vision of the rise of a revolutionary proletariat. It is Bellamy’s focus on the evolutionary,
as opposed to the revolutionary, development of society that is often turned to as a sign of
his inability to significantly break with capitalism. As MacDonald argues, “Bellamy’s
view that the existing society could evolve into a better society implies a basic acceptance
of the former’s essential features” (82). For Beaumont, Bellamy’s means of social
transition suggests his belief that capitalism itself could, under the right conditions, solve
the “social question,” and he views Bellamy’s reliance on economic concentration as the
employment of an essentially capitalist strategy (36-7). However, it must be remembered
that Marx’s vision of the future was not one predicated solely on rupture. While Marx
believed that political revolution was a necessity, he also believed that a socialist society
could only grow from the material foundations constructed by the organic movements of
capitalist forces. In fact, Bellamy’s understanding of the role of economic concentration,
in which the creation of “larger and larger aggregations of capital” makes possible the
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final combination of all production into one rationally organized force (32-3), is an
almost precise transposition of Marx. The latter writes in Capital Volume One:
Everywhere the increased scale of industrial establishments is a startingpoint for a more comprehensive organization of the collective labour of
many people, for a broader development of their material motive forces,
i.e. for the progressive transformation of the isolated processes of
production […] into socially combined and scientifically arranged
processes of production. (780)
Marx believed that this increasing accumulation of wealth would result in a larger
redundant working population and therefore increased misery, followed by increased
unrest which would ultimately lead to political action by the proletariat (929). Bellamy,
on the other hand, while also acknowledging that the society shaped by the great
monopolies was “oppressive and intolerable,” envisions the people collectively realizing
the potential of the “prodigious increase of efficiency” created by these concentrations
and acting peacefully to appropriate the means of production for the collective good (323). However, while the two thinkers differ fundamentally concerning the way in which
the private concentrations of capital would be appropriated for collective use, they share
an understanding of the evolutionary quality inherent in the creation of a socialized
means of production. Therefore, Bellamy’s vision of “industrial evolution” need not be
read as an acceptance of the essential features of capitalism or as an employment of
capitalist strategies. Rather, it marks an alignment with Marx’s vision of the way in
which the material conditions created by capitalism would necessarily be employed as the
foundation for a socialist society.
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It is arguably this understanding of the way in which a socialist society must arise
from a capitalist one that leads Bellamy to employ the language of the latter to describe
the structures of the former. For, despite his employment of capitalist terminology, the
social structures and human relations of capitalism have been thoroughly supplanted in
Bellamy’s utopia by ones built on socialist principles. Many critics do not share this
view. In a comparison between News from Nowhere and Looking Backward, Dentith
argues that while Morris “anticipates no less than a transformation of human relations,”
Bellamy is limited by “arrangements that do not go as far as Morris;” Bellamy, he claims,
is trapped in the trope of inversion, able to imagine a new society only in terms of the
previous one (144). For Raymond Williams, Bellamy’s focus on economic organization
overrules “questions of substantially different social relations and human motives” (57).
Similarly, MacDonald argues that Bellamy’s insistence on economic efficiency creates a
utopia based on values that are “essentially quantitative” and labels him an “intellectual
descendent” of the famous Utilitarian Jeremy Bentham (84). For all of these scholars,
Bellamy’s utopia lacks a significant reimagining of the human experience: his envisioned
changes are economic, focused on a readjustment of quantitative elements, and
overshadowed by ideologies of the past. However, while Bellamy does focus on
economic development as the means by which his new society comes into being, these
material conditions are predicated on a significant change in human relations from
competitive and individualistic to cooperative and social. As Dr. Leete explains to West,
every citizen of the twenty-first century United States is granted an equal share of the
national wealth because they have recognized “the solidarity of the race and the
brotherhood of man” as the foundation of their social relations (77). Moreover, this
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recognition of solidarity is based not on an abstract moral conception but rather on an
understanding of the reality of human interaction. As Leete goes on to explain,
There is no such thing in a civilized society as self-support […] As men
grow more civilized, and the subdivision of occupations and services is
carried out, a complex mutual interdependence becomes the universal rule
[…] The necessity of mutual dependence should imply the duty and
guarantee of mutual support; and that it did not in your day constituted the
essential cruelty and unreason of your system. (77, my emphasis)
There is no doubt that we see here a fundamental shift from the capitalist understanding
of individual autonomy and competition. Bellamy’s utopia is built on the principles of
equality, cooperation, and mutual support. In light of this, it is particularly strange that
MacDonald would associate Bellamy with Bentham, whose conception of human
interaction is based on the absolute supremacy of self-interest divorced from social
relationships. As Marx says, for Bentham, interaction between individuals is predicated
on the idea that the “only force bringing them together, and putting them in relation with
each other, is the selfishness, gain, and private interest of each” (Capital V. 1 280).
Bellamy’s utopia is an unequivocal refutation of this understanding of humanity; in his
imagined society, self-interest is realized as inseparable from collective interests. The
illusion of self-sufficiency has been eradicated, and all individuals operate under the
knowledge that they are functioning as part of a social whole. This realization of human
connectedness not as an abstract conception, but as a material reality, parallels Marx, who
in The German Ideology makes clear that the “common interest does not exist merely in
the imagination” but is first of all the reality of “mutual interdependence” created by the
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division of labor (52). As he goes on to say in Capital Volume One, the inability of the
individual to realize this mutual interdependence is a product of capitalist production,
which, while creating a real human connection through collective labor, obscures this
connection by presenting it as “a plan drawn up by the capitalist”; thus, the workers’
interrelation appears to them as externally constructed (449-51). It is only after capitalism
ceases to obscure this real connection that the worker “strips off the fetters of his
individuality, and develops the capability of his species” (447). For Bellamy, as for
Marx, the process of creating a socialist society requires a new philosophy of human
relations that is predicated on the essential collectivity that already exists in reality. While
Bellamy might employ the language of capitalism, his utopia has stripped away the
impediments of capitalist relations, allowing the individual to recognize herself for what
she truly is: a social being.
Just as this philosophy of human relations is predicated on the reality of mutual
interdependence, the philosophy, in turn, acts upon real material conditions. The
economic structures of Bellamy’s utopia cannot be separated from the guiding principle
of cooperation. According to Leete, in the twenty-first century view, the capitalists of the
nineteenth-century were doomed to failure because of their understanding of human
relations: “Selfishness was their only science, and in industrial production, selfishness is
suicide. Competition, which is the instinct of selfishness, is another word for dissipation
of energy” (144). For Leete, who acts as the voice of Bellamy’s enlightened utopian
population, it is capitalism’s insistence on the role of self-interest and competition that
creates a prodigious waste of human productive power. This parallels Marx, who argues
in Capital Volume One that capitalism “begets, by its anarchic system of competition, the
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most outrageous squandering of labour-power and the social means of production” (667).
For both Bellamy and Marx, it is the driving force of competition that undermines the
productivity of the capitalist system; thus, for both thinkers, the elimination of this
motive force is key to the creation of a truly productive society. In Bellamy’s future
society, they have realized that “combination is the secret of efficient production” and
have utilized this understanding to create a productive force capable of keeping all its
citizens in material comfort (144). This replacement of competition by cooperation, while
an economic strategy, cannot be separated from a fundamental shift in human relations.
Competition can only be eliminated in practice by also eradicating its root cause:
selfishness. This requires an ontological reimaging; the individual must cease to be
viewed as an autonomous entity, driven by self-interest, and instead be understood as part
of an interconnected societal whole. Thus, Bellamy’s focus on economic efficiency,
which critics like MacDonald and Williams have seen as supplanting concerns of human
relations, is intrinsically tied to a fundamental philosophical change. To say, as Dentith
does, that Bellamy does not imagine a “transformation of human relations” is to ignore
the fact that his society is predicated on a new image of humanity as a collective,
cooperative force, an image that parallels Marx’s understanding of life in a socialist
society.
In addition to the eschewal of revolutionary politics and the focus on economic
efficiency, the representation of consumption in Bellamy’s utopia has also been
understood to compromise its socialist status. In Bellamy’s twenty-first century Boston,
buying and selling between individuals is considered “essentially anti-social” because it
is predicated on “self-seeking at the expense of others” (52). There is thus no need for
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money; instead, each citizen, at birth, is granted a “credit card” which represents their
equal share of the national wealth as it is determined annually. The nation is sole
employer and producer, so all goods are considered products of the combined productive
effort of society and are thus purchased not from individuals, but from the nation; goods
are made available through a highly-organized system of “public storehouses” found in
every community (51). Despite this radical change in the way in which consumption is
carried out, both MacDonald and Beaumont have argued that the portrayal of
consumption in Bellamy’s future society links it with the capitalist present in which it
was written. For both scholars, representations of consumption take precedence over
representations of production in Bellamy’s novel. As MacDonald argues, the novel “lacks
any description of the process of production,” but “pays a good deal of attention to the
machinery of circulation” (78). Likewise, Beaumont claims that the “processes of
production are effectively invisible” and that the citizens of Bellamy’s utopia are “by
vocation consumers rather than producers” (39). Both scholars conclude that Looking
Backward is marked by the continued presence of commodity fetishism; in the words of
MacDonald, the novel showcases “the endless consumption of fetishized goods, objects
that magically seem to produce themselves” (80). Thus, they argue, Bellamy’s utopia is
more capitalist than socialist because it hides production while glorifying the
consumption of commodities; further, because production remains hidden, the
commodities still embody the fetishized character of the goods produced in the capitalist
system.
It is true that in his exploration of twenty-first century Boston, West spends a
considerable amount of time in one of the national stores, and there is no doubt that the
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image of this establishment takes on a distinctly utopian character: “I was in a vast hall
full of light […] [I]n the centre of the hall, a magnificent fountain played, cooling the
atmosphere to a delicious freshness with its spray […] Around the fountain was a space
occupied with chairs and sofas, on which many persons were seated conversing” (60).
The description of the store as a site of both aesthetic pleasure and social engagement
makes clear that shopping in Bellamy’s utopia is not a briskly utilitarian function but an
activity in which one can delight. Furthermore, Leete assures West (and thus Bellamy
assures the reader) that while the national wealth is distributed equally to every citizen, it
is so vast as to allow everyone to get “whatever he desires whenever he desires it” (51).
Since there is no scarcity, parsimony, “having lost its utility,” is no longer considered a
virtue; as Leete says, the “nation is rich, and does not wish the people to deprive
themselves of any good thing” (52). There is no doubt, then, some validity to the readings
of Bellamy’s utopia that mark it as enthusiastically consumption-driven. It is also true
that West, and thus the reader, is given no direct access to a site of production; in one
brief scene, West visits a distribution warehouse (the shoppers in Bellamy’s utopia chose
from samples of goods, and then the actual products are distributed by these warehouses
directly to their home), but this is the only definitive image of the vast labor structure that
is the source of all the national wealth being consumed. Furthermore, while the narrative
focuses on the beauty of the site of consumption, the site of labor is noticeably utopian
only in its “prodigiously multiplied efficiency;” it is not a “vast hall full of light,” but a
“gigantic mill” (106). Thus, if we consider West’s physical journey of exploration
through twenty-first century Boston as indicative of the focus of Bellamy’s utopia, the
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argument that consumption is prized over production and that goods appear “magically”
divorced from the labor that creates them, may certainly be accepted.
However, while West himself is not privy to a direct view of the labor process,
the very structure of Bellamy’s imagined society forecloses the possibility that labor is
hidden from the view of his utopian citizens; thus, the reading of Bellamy’s utopia as
enmeshed in the capitalist world of commodity fetishism is compromised. As Marx
explains the process of commodity fetishism in Capital Volume One, the “mysterious
character of the commodity-form” is created by the fact that, in a capitalist system,
commodities take on the social relations that exist in reality among the producers; the
labor process, the real source of animate connections and relationships, is obscured by the
exchange of commodities, which act in the market as “autonomous figures endowed with
a life of their own” (165). Therefore, the “veil is not removed from the countenance of
the social life-process, i.e. the process of material production, until it becomes production
by freely associated men, and stands under their rational and planned control” (173).
While MacDonald and Beaumont see this veil as still being firmly in place in Bellamy’s
utopia, his society is a rationally-organized collective of voluntary workers of the very
nature that Marx here imagines. As I have argued, Bellamy’s major philosophical move
is his structuring of social relations around the acceptance of an essential human
interconnectedness that stems from material relations of production. In his utopian
society, the citizens comprise a vast labor force called the “industrial army” that carries
out all production; while some members may chose at a certain point to pursue
professions not directly tied to material production, every citizen is educated concerning
the way in which production is carried out in their society. As Leete explains, “A
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thorough study of the National industrial system, with the history and rudiments of all the
great trades, is an essential part of our educational system […] Our schools are constantly
visiting our workshops, and often are taken on long excursions to inspect particular
industrial enterprises” (39). While the purpose of this component of education (which
Leete assures West does not overshadow the “intellectual culture” of the schools) is
primarily to prepare the citizen to choose an occupation for which he is best suited1, it
also serves to connect Bellamy’s Bostonians with the intricacies of the process that
produces their material environment. In addition to this educational component, all male
citizens, before entering their chosen industrial profession or pursuing further training in
the “professional schools,” must serve for three years as “unskilled or common laborers,”
a period in which they are expected to perform a variety of socially-necessary duties (412). This serves to further connect the (male) members of Bellamy’s utopia to its material
foundations, giving them more practical knowledge of the processes that underlie the
creation of their nation’s vast material wealth. As a member of the industrial army, every
citizen is expected to have an understanding of the way in which the collective work
force functions. Thus, Bellamy’s society can be said, returning to the words of Marx, to
truly commit itself to lifting the “veil” from the “countenance of the social life-process.”
While Bellamy’s reader, seeing through the eyes of West, may be blind to the specifics of
the production process, the citizens of his utopia are not; the goods they purchase do not
just “mysteriously” appear as fetishized commodities do in the capitalist system.

I must note here that my choice of the masculine pronoun has significance. While women are also
members of the industrial army, and seemingly undergo the same education, they are greatly limited
in their choice of employment: they form a distinct work force of “feminine” occupations.
1
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Furthermore, while goods still embody exchange-value in Bellamy’s utopia, it is
the creation of use-values that drives production; thus, there is a decisive reversal from
the way in which goods are produced in a capitalist system. As Marx explains, “Usevalues are produced by capitalists only because and in so far as they form the material
substratum of exchange-value, are the bearers of exchange-value” (CV.1 293). Because
the capitalist is primarily concerned with the valorization process, with the making of
more capital, he is largely unconcerned with the social utility of the goods that are
incidentally produced during this process. In Bellamy’s Boston, because there are no
individual producers or markets for the buying and selling of goods, the production of
use-values is no longer subjugated to the production of exchange-value. Goods must still
be understood as commodities in Bellamy’s utopia: they do take on an abstract
quantifiable value. However, because all production is carried out as a cooperative social
venture, and the profit motive which arises with competitive production is removed, the
exchange-value of a commodity is derived solely from the amount of socialized labor
which is employed in producing it (109). Because it is the collective force of workers
which controls the means of production, there is no outside entity to extract surplusvalue; exchange-value thus becomes a direct representation of what Marx calls the
“socially necessary labour-time” required by society in the production of a commodity
(CV.1 129). In order for both production and distribution to be collectively and rationally
organized for the meeting of social needs, both labor and the goods produced must be
considered in the abstract: exchange-value thus loses its primary character and becomes a
means to create and deliver use-values.
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Commodities have also largely lost their fetishized character for the consumer. As
Leete explains, in a society in which goods have ceased to represent monetary value,
“accumulations of personal property are merely burdensome the moment they exceed
what adds to the real comfort” (69). Since exchange-value has become only a necessary
means of organization, use-value has been restored as the means by which goods are
evaluated. Once goods have ceased to represent money, they again assume their own
“sensuous properties” and are purchased for the comfort and enjoyment they provide.
Each citizen may use her allotted share of the national wealth in any way she chooses;
because every individual can easily provide for her immediate physical needs and still
have much left over, the use of the remainder is guided by the personal interests of each.
One may spend it on “pretty clothes,” another on an “elaborate table,” but, as Leete’s
daughter Edith says, nothing is done for the purpose of “ostentation” but is always “a
matter of taste” (64). Furthermore, while personal luxury is not discouraged, the social
character of existence in Bellamy’s utopia guides not just the process of production but
also the act of consumption; as Leete explains, much of the surplus wealth is voluntarily
spent, not on individual pleasures, but on “public works and pleasures in which all share
[…] and in providing on a vast scale for the recreations of the people:” “At home we
have comfort, but the splendor of our life is, on its social side, that which we share with
our fellows” (143). While all purchases are guided by an evaluation of use-value, a fact in
itself marking a significant break with consumption under capitalism, consumption is
further guided by the underlying socialist principles of collective living. Thus, while
consumption may be celebrated in Bellamy’s utopia, its character has been radically
changed to reflect the new nature of human relations in his imagined future.
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I have thus far attempted to establish that Looking Backward presents a utopian
vision that is built on the material conditions of capitalism while breaking with its
ideological foundations and establishing a new philosophical basis for human relations;
the employment of the collective labor force created by capitalist modes of production in
a cooperative manner for the public good is, I have argued, in line with Marx’s
conception of the way in which a socialist society would grow from a capitalist one,
despite the absence of political revolution in Bellamy’s vision. I will now turn to an
examination of the way in which this collective labor force is organized and employed to
establish its connection to Marx’s vision of a socialist future. Bellamy’s “industrial army”
has been derided by many critics for its obviously militant associations. Morris argued
that while Bellamy “tells us that every man is free to choose his occupation and that work
is no burden to anyone, the impression which he produces is that of a huge standing
army, tightly drilled, compelled by some mysterious fate to unceasing anxiety for the
production of wares” (356). Writing from a twentieth-century perspective, Williams
associates Bellamy’s organization of labor with a “Stalinist version of the bureaucratic
party” (60), and, more recently, Samuel Haber has labeled Bellamy’s approach to
economic organization “thoroughly authoritarian” (433). I believe we again have a
situation, as with Bellamy’s continued usage of capitalist terminology, in which his
chosen language obscures the real meaning of his vision. While everyone must serve in
the industrial army in some capacity, Bellamy imagines this service not as obligatory
adherence to an authoritarian command but rather as the voluntary fulfillment of a social
duty. For Bellamy, the usage of the term “army” implies not compulsory obedience but
service driven by “the ardor of self-devotion” (57). As opposed to in a capitalist system,
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in which every individual is forced to work in order to survive, the provision that every
citizen is provided for equally from the social wealth, regardless of the nature of his
contribution, removes this self-interested compulsion to labor. Thus, the labor of the
individual is recognized for what it is: a contribution to the collective welfare of society.
As I have argued, this recognition of the role of each individual as part of an
interconnected whole marks an ontological shift that changes the nature of human
relations. It is with an understanding of this ontological shift that participation in the
industrial army must be considered. The individual who genuinely understands herself as
an intrinsic part of a social whole need not be coerced into service; her participation is not
external to her, but is an element of her essential existence as a social being. As Leete
makes clear, the sense of duty felt by the citizens of Bellamy’s utopia is not based on an
abstract conception of national unity (though the continued usage of the term “patriotism”
admittedly seems to suggest this) but is instead the product of a larger understanding of
human connection; as he explains, the rule that everyone in their society must work is an
extension of “the law of nature—the edict of Eden” and thus their system is “the logical
outcome of the operation of human nature under rational conditions” (68). While the
phrase “edict of Eden” implies a religious element clearly eschewed by Marx, Bellamy’s
understanding of this connection between humanity and labor echoes the Marx of
Capital, who describes labor as “the everlasting nature-imposed condition of human
existence” (290). Thus, the law that everyone must work is not an imposition by an
authoritarian regime but a recognition by all the members of society of the fundamental
nature of human existence. Thus, labor performed for the collective good is viewed, in
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Bellamy’s utopia, as a way in which its members willingly embrace their shared
humanity.
As Morris notes in the above quotation, Bellamy does tell us that every citizen is
allowed to choose the work for which he or she is best suited (as long as that work is
properly gendered) and that work is no longer viewed as a burden. The educational
system under Bellamy’s utopia is designed to provide its members with ample
opportunity to learn about all trades so that they may choose the one for which they feel
they are best suited. While the administration is tasked with assuring that the necessary
number of workers are allotted to each trade, and the worker may sometimes have to take
his second choice of occupation for some time, he may switch to his first-choice trade
later, when the space becomes available (40-1). Furthermore, any citizen wishing to
pursue a “professional” occupation, such as science, medicine, or music, is eligible to
attend an institution of “higher liberal learning” (43). While Bellamy’s utopia does seem
to genuinely create conditions that allow the worker to freely choose his occupation, the
question of whether or not he has created a society in which work is no longer a burden is
one that requires further examination. For Morris, who believes that labor should be a
source of pleasure and personal fulfillment, Bellamy appears to seek only to make labor
“tolerable” by “decreas[ing] the amount of it” (357). It is true that Bellamy focuses on the
reduction of labor time as a necessary component of his utopian vision; every member of
the industrial army serves only twenty-four years; he is educated until the age of twentyone and goes into retirement at the age of forty-five (37). Furthermore, one of the ways in
which the administration makes arduous occupations, such as mining, attractive to
potential volunteers is the shortening of hours; the “lighter trades, prosecuted under the
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most agreeable circumstances” require longer working hours (40). However, this is not,
as Morris suggests, the only way in which labor is made attractive to the citizens of
Bellamy’s utopia. The organization of labor imagined by Bellamy is predicated on the
belief that individuals have a wide variety of interests and aptitudes; thus, all occupations,
even the most demanding, can be carried out by “persons having natural tastes for them”
(40). In Bellamy’s conception, the shortening of the working day is only an extra
incentive to those who already have some desire to perform the task. Furthermore, the
balancing of working hours is based largely on a rational consideration of physical
health: the text implies that it is those occupations which will most quickly wear on the
physical well-being of the worker (like mining) that are subject to the shortest hours.
There is no doubt, however, that the primary way in which labor is made attractive to the
worker of Bellamy’s utopia is through the sense of self-fulfillment that arises from
performing an essential social duty. As Leete explains to West, it is the “inspiration of
duty” and the “passion for humanity” within their workforce that creates “the ardor of
self-devotion which animates its members” (56-7). The individual, viewing himself as an
integral part of a greater social whole, does not begrudgingly carry out his employment
but is inspired to do so and is passionate in his labor. The sense of solidarity that
underlies Bellamy’s utopia “animates” each worker: his work in the service of his fellows
fills him with life. The worker of this imagined twenty-first century realizes, in the words
of the early Marx, that “what I create from myself I create for society, conscious of
myself as a social being” (Manuscripts 350). As a conscious social being, the individual
finds fulfillment and pleasure in his labor because it further connects him to those for
whom his product is created; his labor is not individualized, but social, activity.
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So, Bellamy’s society does not simply seek to reduce the amount of labor
performed, as Morris contends; however, his utopian vision is shaped by a philosophy
that greatly limits the role of labor and significantly undermines the potential of his
radically reimagined system of human relations. While Bellamy presents labor as not
merely an unpleasant obligation to be minimized as much as possible, he also makes
clear that labor performed to meet the material needs of society, even when made
attractive, is the foundation, not the source, of individual self-fulfillment. As explained by
Dr. Leete:
[T]he labor we have to render as our part in securing for the nation the
means of a comfortable physical existence is by no means regarded as the
most important, the most interesting, or the most dignified employment of
our powers. We look upon it as a necessary duty to be discharged before
we can fully devote ourselves to the higher exercise of our faculties, the
intellectual and spiritual enjoyments and pursuits which alone mean life.
(115)
He goes on to say that while everything is done to make labor attractive, and that labor is
“not usually irksome, and is often inspiring,” labor’s true value is that it provides the
material basis that allows for the pursuit of “higher and larger activities” which are “the
main business of existence” (115). This unequivocal distinction between labor done in
service of the collective and individual productive activity is one that distinctly aligns
with the Marx of Capital. In Volume Three, he directly discusses the role of labor in a
socialist society:
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The realm of freedom really begins where labour determined by necessity
and external expediency ends; it lies by its very nature beyond the sphere
of material production proper. Just as the savage must wrestle with nature
to satisfy his needs, to maintain and reproduce his life, so must civilized
man […] This realm of natural necessity expands with his development,
because his needs do too; but the productive forces to satisfy these expand
at the same time. Freedom, in this sphere, can consist only in this, that
socialized man, the associated producers, govern the human metabolism
with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective control
instead of being dominated by it as a blind power; accomplishing it with
the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy and
appropriate for their human nature. But this always remains a realm of
necessity. The true realm of freedom, the development of human powers as
an end in itself, begins beyond it. The reduction of the working day is the
basic prerequisite. (959, my emphasis)
While it has been my intention throughout this chapter to establish an alignment between
Marx and Bellamy, it is the philosophical continuity of these passages that is, for me, the
most striking. Both thinkers clearly put forth a future vision in which the “realm of
necessity” is provided for by a rationally organized collective force and the true
development of human powers occurs outside of this realm. Material production serves
only as a foundation for a higher purpose, the allowance of the individual’s ability to
express her humanity through pursuits divorced from the meeting of material needs.
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A further examination of Bellamy’s utopia will reveal the problems inherent in
this distinction between the “realm of necessity” and the “realm of freedom.” This fissure
between necessity and freedom sets up two others that compromise Bellamy’s utopian
project: one between the state and the individual and one between manual and intellectual
labor. As I have argued, Bellamy’s utopia transcends capitalist social relations through its
portrayal of the individual as a social being, as an intrinsic part of the social whole;
furthermore, he acknowledges that this connection is not founded on an abstract
conception but is actively established through the individual’s productive contributions.
The realization of this connection means, in Bellamy’s vision, that the individual is
inspired by a “passion for humanity” that positions her work to be a means of selffulfillment. However, Bellamy’s insistence that it is not through the work done for the
collective that the individual truly develops her humanity undermines his utopian vision
of the social being. This insistence suggests that the worker’s life is divided into two
parts: the work she performs for society’s benefit and the individualized activities she
performs for her own fulfillment. While throughout most of the novel, Bellamy insists
that the labor performed in the industrial army is a source of individual fulfillment, by the
end of the novel he begins to equivocate: “work is not usually irksome, and is often
inspiring.” Bellamy sets up the potential for all necessary labor to be made individually
meaningful by the understanding of material production as an expression of the laborer’s
social being, but his later presentation of the social realm of necessity as primarily a
means to an end significantly blocks this potential.
In addition to creating a problematic barrier between the individual and society,
the distinction between the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom requires that a
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barrier be placed between two distinct types of production performed in these realms.
Furthermore, in the conception of both Bellamy and Marx, these types of production need
not only be distinguished from one another but must also be unequally valued, the latter
prized over the former. Even establishing such a barrier seems a futile project; as Marx
himself notes, the realm of necessity is a moving target: it “expands with his [man’s]
development, because his needs do to.” How does one even articulate which production
is done out of necessity? For Bellamy, this realm of necessity becomes all work
performed in the service of providing a “comfortable physical existence;” necessary
production in Bellamy’s utopia is by no means limited to what could be considered
necessity. Leete tells West that the nation “does not wish the people to deprive
themselves of any good thing” (52); their society is one that encourages comfort and the
enjoyment of material goods. Since all goods consumed are produced by the same
collective labor force, this means that much of the energy of that body must be spent on
material production. This material production becomes, for Bellamy, largely equated to
manual labor. Earlier in the novel, Bellamy suggests that there is no distinction of value
between kinds of labor in his utopia; all contributions are viewed as equal. Leete,
explaining to West that there is no longer any shame in waiting tables, claims that “there
is recognized no sort of difference between the dignity of the different sorts of work
required by the nation” (92). However, establishing a distinction between manual and
intellectual labor problematizes this statement. In Bellamy’s construction, an individual
may choose, after his three-year service as a common laborer, to pursue a higher
education and thus serve the nation with his “brains” rather than his “hands:” these are
the members of Bellamy’s society who become scientists, doctors, and scholars (43).
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While these workers are still considered to serve the nation, they are not engaged directly
in material production. Their work instead aligns with what Leete describes as the
“higher and larger” intellectual activities that supposedly are carried out only after one
has rendered his service to the nation, “those scientific, artistic, literary, or scholarly
interests which make leisure the one thing valuable to their possessors” (115). The
problem here is apparent: In a society in which intellectual and manual labor in service of
the nation are supposed to be of equal worth, how can intellectual pursuits, when
performed in the individual’s “leisure” time, be defined as more valuable than any other
activity? How does, for instance, the scientific activity performed in the service of the
nation differ from the scientific activity performed in one’s leisure time? How is the
former considered equivalent to manual labor while the latter is considered superior?
This blatant contradiction exposes a crack in Bellamy’s vision of labor equality. It
becomes clear, in his attempt to distinguish between activities performed in the realm of
necessity and those performed in the realm of freedom, that no such distinction can
actually be made; in the case of intellectual pursuits, they are the same activities,
performed on either side of an arbitrary line. It is thus further revealed that the distinction
he is actually making, despite his assertions to the contrary, is not one between service to
the nation and individual “free” time, but one between physical and intellectual
contributions, between those who labor with their “hands” and those who labor with their
“brains.” While these contributions may be equal in “dignity” on the social scale,
Bellamy makes clear that it is the latter pursuits “which alone mean life” (115).
Bellamy’s society ensures that all its citizens are provided with the means to enjoy
intellectual and artistic pursuits; all members of society receive a thorough education,
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having no social duties until the age of twenty-one. In response to West’s concern that
such a complete education would leave the young people entering the workforce
disinclined to pursue any kind of manual labor, Leete explains that the purpose of this
education is not to prepare one for a particular kind of work; instead, “the highest
education is deemed necessary to fit a man merely to live” (129). In this way, Bellamy’s
society is focused on producing what Marx calls “fully developed human beings” (CV.1
614). The worker is no longer the “one-sided implement” he becomes in capitalist
production (CV.1 460), but is free to develop a full range of human capacities. However,
the devaluing of manual labor undermines this process of full development; instead of
viewing the labor performed by much of his society in the service of providing for social
needs as part of this process of development, Bellamy effectively precludes it. Thus, in
Bellamy’s conception, the average worker’s daily activity is separated from his growth as
a human being.
It is likely that Marx did not intend for the “realm of necessity” to be defined as
broadly as Bellamy’s utopia imagines it. As Eagleton argues, for Marx, “we are most
human and least like other animals when we produce freely, gratuitously, independent of
any immediate material need. Freedom for Marx is a kind of creative superabundance
over what is materially essential” (6, my emphasis). While Marx may have intended that
only “immediate” and “essential” needs must be met before the individual can begin to
produce freely, there is no practical way to define what constitutes either of these terms
on a social scale. In Bellamy’s utopia, a life full of comfort and beauty is considered a
necessity; it is the bare minimum of life allowed. Thus, all production in service of this
end becomes necessary production. What occurs, then, when labor in what Marx terms
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“material production proper” becomes devalued as a mere means to an end is that the
continual expansion of the “realm of natural necessity” leads to an increasing variety of
labor that is divorced from the realm of freedom. Further, Marx’s insistence that labor
performed in the realm of necessity be accomplished with “the least expenditure of
energy” becomes problematic in light of his earlier assertion in Capital Volume One that
the labor process should unite the mental and physical capacities of the worker (643).
Can the worker, who is to expend the least amount of energy possible in the production
of social necessities, not bring her intellectual and artistic energies into the physical
creation of the material world in which she lives? Can she not produce objects that are
both a necessity and an expression of her creative human powers? If so, then why would
this production hold any less value than the development of human powers as “an end in
itself”? While Bellamy’s distinction between mental and intellectual labor runs counter
to Marx’s fundamental understanding of human productive activity, the latter’s insistence
that necessary production is to be valued only for its efficiency forms the basis for
Bellamy’s belief that the individual need not express her full range of human capacities in
the performance of her work.
In many ways, Bellamy’s utopia actively combats the presence of alienated labor
produced by the capitalist system of production. The early Marx defined alienated labor
as that which separates man from the products of his labor, from other human beings, and
from his own “vital activity” (Manuscripts 328-9). In Bellamy’s society, the worker is no
longer divorced from the products of his labor; the elimination of class means that those
who produce the goods are no longer barred from their consumption. Furthermore, the
making visible of the labor process through the education of each individual as to its
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workings connects the processes of production and consumption, thus uniting labor with
its product on a social scale. Bellamy’s utopia also eliminates the estrangement of the
worker from his fellows by creating a society built on solidarity and cooperation and
establishing the worker’s production as social activity. However, the way in which he
defines “vital activity” undermines the potential of his utopia to fully eradicate alienated
labor. Bellamy’s utopia sets up a society in which all labor has the potential to be a selffulfilling activity for the worker. Labor is not forced, but voluntary, and every worker is
educated in such a way as to choose employment for which he is well-suited and from
which he can derive enjoyment. Further, there is no indication that manual labor in
Bellamy’s utopia must be divorced from mental activity. The goods in Bellamy’s utopia
are associated not just with utility, but with beauty; West’s description of the “broad
streets, shaded by trees and lined with fine buildings” in between which “statues glistened
and fountains flashed” marks a blending of utility and aesthetics that carries over into the
“bewildering variety” of fabrics that he finds at the massive and elegant shopping center
(22, 60). Bellamy’s material world suggests not utility and uniformity, but beauty and
variety; thus, the active creation of it, the labor performed in its production, need not be
wholly divorced from an aesthetically-motivated craftsmanship or a variety of activity.
Furthermore, while the worker in Bellamy’s utopia usually remains in the same trade for
his entire career, there is no indication that he is subject to a monotonous repetition of
activity; in fact, Leete tells us that advancement of position is common in the industrial
army and that this advancement is facilitated by knowledge of one’s trade and skill in its
execution (75). There are therefore significant indications that manual labor in Bellamy’s
utopia is not just mindless, mechanized activity. However, by separating labor in the
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material realm from the “higher activities” that “alone mean life,” in denying this labor
the status of “vital activity,” Bellamy suggests that the worker is ultimately alienated
from his labor. His labor is not considered, in the words of the early Marx, part of his
“essential being” (Manuscripts 326). It is thus the insistence on the separation between
the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom, shared by both Bellamy and the late
Marx, that allows for the continued presence of alienated labor. In classifying “vital
activity” as only that which occurs outside the realm of material production, both thinkers
put forth a societal vision in which much of the work performed is philosophically
proscribed from contributing to the “full and free development” of the individual. In the
next chapter, I will examine the way in which Morris and the early Marx, in eschewing
the distinction between necessary human production and free human production, move
beyond this limited definition of “vital activity” and thus move beyond alienated labor in
a way that Bellamy and the Marx of Capital do not.
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CHAPTER TWO: LABOR AS LIFE-ACTIVITY IN NEWS FROM NOWHERE
While Bellamy shied away from an association with socialism, Morris left no
doubt that he was a passionate socialist. He publicly announced his conversion to
socialism in 1883 and remained active in various socialist organizations for much of his
life. Morris also directly acknowledged his debt to Marx; in his “The Hopes of
Civilization,” Morris credits Marx for making “modern Socialism what it is” through his
historical analysis of class struggle and his conception of the inevitable evolution that
would bring Socialism into being (323). In “How I Became a Socialist,” Morris explains
that he turned to Marx for a better understanding of the “economical side of Socialism”
(380). Morris’s relationship to Marx was established primarily though his reading of
Capital Volume One; adopting the Althusserian conception of the epistemological break,
scholars such as Rob Breton and Ruth Kinna have noted that Morris only had access to
the “scientific” Marx and thus consider his contributions to Morris’s thought as being
primarily structural, as opposed to ethical (47, 500). Judging by his own account, this
seems to be the way in which Morris read Marx: as an historian and economist, not a
philosopher. As Stanley Pierson explains in his insightful history of British Socialism, the
Marx to whom Morris had access “left little room for the questions which engaged
Morris most deeply;” thus, Morris, like other “Ethical Socialists” of his time, “inserted
his own ideas and values into the Marxist framework” (80).
While Morris’s historical relationship to Marx has often been discussed, what has
not been thoroughly examined is the way in which Morris, in seeking an ethic to
supplement the “scientific” socialism of the later Marx, comes to adopt a philosophy that
significantly aligns with Marx’s early works, namely the Economic and Philosophical
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Manuscripts and The German Ideology, which were not published until years after
Morris’s death. Furthermore, as I have argued in my introduction, the conception of the
Althusserian break, which postulates that the later Marx abandoned his early
philosophical humanism, is problematic. Instead, I have read Marx as remaining faithful
to his notion of a human essence that should be allowed to flourish in every individual
and have argued that the significant shift in Marx regards his understanding of the role of
labor in this process of human emancipation: while the early Marx presents all
unalienated labor as a fundamental component of human development, the later Marx
severs the realization of the human essence from necessary material production. In this
chapter, I will seek to establish that Morris’s philosophy of labor, as expressed in News
from Nowhere, aligns with that of the early Marx and will thus argue that through this
alignment Morris necessarily (while perhaps not consciously) does not simply fill a void
left by the “scientific” Marx, but places himself in opposition to the philosophy of labor
that underlies Marx’s later works. Peter Smith has recently acknowledged, in an
important move away from a strictly historical understanding of the relationship between
Morris and Marx, that Morris “reinstated some of the key principles in the early writing
of Marx” (139); however, he also assumes that the “ontological significance of labor”
recognized by Morris and the early Marx remains unchanged for the Marx of Capital and
thus aligns Morris with a monolithic vision of Marx’s philosophy of labor (131). In
reading Morris’s utopia as an expression of the early labor philosophy of Marx, I will
highlight the important distinction between the early and late Marx overlooked by Smith
and will show that Morris’s separation from the labor philosophy of both the later Marx
and Bellamy is the key to his utopia’s success in practically overcoming the alienation of
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labor: In refusing to acknowledge a distinction between the “realm of necessity” and the
“realm of freedom,” Morris presents a society in which all labor can be understood as
connected to the human essence. Furthermore, I will argue that while Morris, unlike
Bellamy, echoes Marx’s vision of the way in which socialism would be achieved through
political revolution, he comes into conflict with the Marx of Capital in his hesitancy to
employ the collective productive forces of capitalism as the economic foundation for his
socialist utopia. In doing so, Morris further removes himself from the vision of the
socialist future presented by both the later Marx and Bellamy. In the case of Bellamy, I
have argued that it is his limited view of the role of labor that compromises his utopia; in
this chapter, I will argue that, for Morris, it is his desire to completely break with the
economic foundations of capitalism that imposes limitations on his utopian vision.
As with Looking Backward, the reader sees Morris’s imagined future through the
eyes of a visitor from the nineteenth century. William “Guest” (as he gives his surname to
the inhabitants of Nowhere) is a socialist who falls asleep in nineteenth-century London
and mysteriously awakes in the year 2102 to find that the city in which he fell asleep has
been radically transformed: In place of “smoke-vomiting chimneys” and the clamor of
“riveting and hammering,” he finds a sparkling, unpolluted Thames lined with “quaint
and fanciful little buildings” (48). As with Bellamy’s West, Guest is helped to understand
his new surroundings by friendly inhabitants of the new society. Guest quickly comes to
understand, through both his own observations and the explanations of his new
companions, that the world in which he finds himself is one in which humanity’s
relationship to labor has been fundamentally changed. Instead of being a necessary
burden, labor has become one of the primary pleasures of life. Much of Guest’s journey
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through Nowhere is the process of learning how labor came to be viewed in such a way;
as Daniel Shea has cleverly noted, Morris creates “a quest tale whose goal is unalienated
labor itself” (158). One of the first things Guest discovers is that labor in Nowhere is not
performed for monetary gain; his first encounter with an inhabitant of Nowhere is the
young and handsome Dick, who is working as a boatman on the Thames. After having
“employed” Dick to take him out into the water for a swim, he attempts to pay him for
his services. Dick is confused by the offered coins and explains that he would feel strange
about taking a “gift” from Guest in exchange for his services because “giving people
casts about the water is my business, which I would do for anybody; so to take gifts in
connection with it would look very queer” (50). The absence of monetary exchange in
Nowhere is confirmed for Guest when he is taken by Dick, who becomes his guide, to a
market, where he discovers that the young girl running the shop is equally as confused
about the subject of payment (74). So, neither services rendered nor materially productive
labor is tied to the laborer’s subsistence: there is no system of exchange to purchase the
worker’s time or product. Guest also discovers that inhabitants of Nowhere are engaged
in a variety of employments. When he asks if Dick will be able to quit his employment as
a boatman to act as his guide, Dick informs him that he has a friend who would be very
pleased to take over the task while he is away: “He is a weaver from Yorkshire, who has
rather overdone himself between his weaving and his mathematics, both indoor work,
you see; and being a great friend of mine, he naturally came to me to get him some
outdoor work” (51). Dick’s friend, though already engaged in both a materially
productive activity and an intellectual one, is still in search of further variety that will
allow him time to work outdoors. Guest also learns from this exchange that labor is self50

directed; in Nowhere, one may move fluidly from one employment to another as one
feels inclined to do so. It thus becomes clear that labor in Nowhere is not only freed from
any ties to the worker’s subsistence but is also freed from the external pressure of a
societal system that structures employment. Guest soon learns that, in the absence of
external pressures, the only motivating force behind the individual’s decision to work is
his desire to do so. While Dick acknowledges that, in the past, there was a “disease called
Idleness,” he says that now the idea that someone might not like to work is “too
ridiculous” (75-6). Dick refers to employments such as “house-building, and streetpaving, and gardening” as “genuinely amusing work” (68). This is confirmed when he
and Guest come upon a group of workers mending a road, and Guest notes that after
moving out of the travelers’ way, they return eagerly to their employment “like men with
a pleasant task at hand;” Dick explains that group tasks like this are considered “good
sport” and carry with them a great amount of merriment because “everything seems like a
joke when we have a pleasant spell of work on” (83).
Guest’s journey leads him to the home of Dick’s great-grandfather, Hammond,
who is to act as Guest’s primary source of direct information about the transformed role
of labor in Morris’s utopia; as Leete acts as the voice of Bellamy, guiding the reader
through the underlying ideals of his utopia, so Hammond acts as the voice of Morris.
Claiming to be traveler from a far-off place, Guest explains to Hammond that he should
speak to him of their society as though he were “a being from another planet” (89).
Furthermore, as someone interested in history who possesses a much greater knowledge
of the past than Dick, Hammond is able to act as a bridge between Guest’s time and his
own. It is to Hammond that Guest puts the pressing question of “how you get people to
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work when there is no reward of labour, and especially how you get them to work
strenuously?” (122). Hammond’s reply reveals the philosophy of labor around which
Morris’s entire utopian vision is structured; he tells Guest that “the reward of labour is
life,” and that the payment for “especially good work” is “the reward of creation” (122).
He goes on to say that being paid for “the pleasure of creation, which is what excellence
in work means” would be akin to having “a bill sent in for the begetting of children”
(122). In response to Guest’s rebuttal that people have a “natural desire” to procreate but
no such innate desire to work, Hammond asserts that this is “wholly untrue” (122); their
society, he explains, is built on the premise that “happiness without happy daily work is
impossible” (123). In Morris’s imagined future, labor is understood to be a fundamental
element of human existence; it is as “natural” to the species as procreation. Like
procreation, it is necessary for the continuation of species-life, it is the means through
which existence itself is created. Labor, however, is not just a necessity; it is the way in
which the individual expresses her innate human desire to create. Because of this natural
desire to create, labor is a process of making visible the worker’s human essence; she
thus strives in her work because her product is an extension of herself. Without the means
to express her human desire to create, the individual would be incomplete; thus, there is
no happiness without daily productive activity. In removing external pressures to labor,
Morris’s imagined society has simply allowed human nature to flourish by reuniting the
individual with her innate desire to work.
It is in this understanding of labor as a fundamental human activity essential to the
full development of the individual that Morris aligns his utopian vision with the early
writings of Marx. For the Marx of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, the
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worker is alienated from his labor under the capitalist system because “the labor is
external to the worker, i.e. it does not belong to his essential being; […] he therefore does
not confirm himself in his work, but denies himself, feels miserable and not happy, does
not develop free mental and physical energy, but mortifies his flesh and ruins his mind”
(326, my emphasis). As Marx makes clear, it is only through a reunification with his own
production that the worker fully realizes his “essential being.” For Marx, the human
essence is not an abstract conception but is shaped by the active interaction of the
individual with the material world: “The whole character of a species, its speciescharacter, resides in the nature of its life activity, and free conscious activity constitutes
the species-character of man” (328). This “life activity,” for Marx, takes the form of
production and labor; as he explains, “The practical creation of an objective world, the
fashioning of inorganic nature, is proof that man is a conscious species-being […] It is
therefore in his fashioning of the objective that man really proves himself to be a speciesbeing. Such production is his active species-life” (329). Thus, for both Morris and Marx,
the individual, in order to realize her humanity, must engage in productive activity; she
must participate in the “fashioning of the objective” to realize her essence as a creative
being. As Marx argues, while the worker engages in such production in the capitalist
system, his own life-activity appears as alien to him because he is compelled to work by
another, thus “he feels that he is acting freely only in his animal functions—eating,
drinking and procreating;” therefore, his labor constitutes not “the satisfaction of need but
a mere means to satisfy needs outside itself” (326-7). In other words, what should
constitute his life, his productive activity, becomes merely something he does in order
that he might live when he is done working; because this life for which the worker strives
53

is separated from his essentially human activity, it is only “animal” life. It is for this
reason that Marx, in The German Ideology, stresses that material labor must not be
viewed as merely a means to an end; he argues that because human beings “begin to
distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of
subsistence,” this “mode of production must not be considered simply as being the
reproduction of the physical existence of individuals. Rather it is a definite form of
expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part” (37). Production, the foundation
of human “life-activity,” is inextricably tied to the meeting of material needs; therefore,
there can be no separation between the creation of the material world and the expression
of the human essence. This is the meaning of Hammond’s assertion that “the reward of
labour is life;” it is the recognition that labor creates life in the sense that it produces the
material conditions of existence while simultaneously embodying human life-activity.
Because of this recognition that labor is life-activity, not merely a means to an end, daily
work in Morris’s utopia, the meeting of everyday needs, becomes a source of pleasure
which carries with it the “reward of creation.” The fact that labor has become a central
pleasure of life signifies that the worker has been reunited with his “essential being” and
is no longer alienated from his labor: the worker now “confirms himself in his work,” no
longer “denies himself” or “feels miserable and not happy,” but is free to fully develop
his “mental and physical energy.”
Thus for Morris, as for the early Marx, the individual does not fully develop as a
human being until she can freely express her creative essence through the production of
her material existence; the meeting of material necessities is not an obstacle to be
overcome so that real life may begin, but a fundamental life process. It is in this way that
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the understanding of labor shared by Morris and the early Marx diverges from that shared
by Bellamy and the later Marx. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, the latter
present a vision of a socialist society in which labor performed in the “realm of
necessity” is divorced from activities performed in the “realm of freedom” which
constitute the individual’s essential human activity. In Bellamy’s utopia, this creates a
situation in which much of the labor performed in his imagined society is precluded from
contributing to the development of the individual as a creative species-being; while his
citizens voluntarily engage in material production, and this daily activity is made as
pleasurable as possible by matching individuals with the job for which they are best
suited, material production is still considered fundamentally as a duty to be performed, as
a means rather than an end-in-itself. In contrast, in Morris’s utopia, all labor is celebrated
as essential human activity which contributes to the happiness of the individual. This
philosophical difference does not remain in the realm of the abstract but forms the
respective underlying structures of the two utopias; a thorough examination of the way in
which Morris imagines labor to be carried out in his utopia and the way in which his
vision differs from Bellamy’s will highlight the practical differences in application of the
two philosophies.
Morris’s reimagining of labor in News from Nowhere has often been considered
as advocating a return to the principles of medieval handicraft. As Smith argues, Morris
embraced a “nostalgic aestheticism” which “saw in the craftworkers of the Middle Ages a
level of imaginative agency quite lacking in the modern artisan” (146). Likewise, for
Kinna, Morris seeks “to reestablish work on the basis of a craft-specialism” that is
distinctly “pre-capitalist” in nature (511). There are certainly grounds for a reading of
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Morris’s utopia that highlights his attention to craftwork; his vision of a socialist future
clearly prizes skilled handicraft over the industrialized production of the capitalist
present. From Guest’s first vision of the sparkling Thames, it is clear that the factories
which once lined its waters have been eliminated. As Hammond explains to Guest, a
return to handicraft after the revolution that brought about the new order (which I will
discuss in more detail later) constituted a blending of art and utility that contributed
significantly to the new vision of labor as fundamental life-activity. According to
Hammond, once the worker was freed from the imperative to produce “slave-wares for
the poor and mere wealth-wasting wares for the rich,” he began to put that saved time and
energy into the production of goods that were both useful and beautiful, the production
“of what used to be called art, but which has no name amongst us now, because it has
become a necessary part of the labour of every man who produces” (160). No longer
forced to overwork by the demands of capitalist production, workers were allowed the
freedom to “do the best they could with the work at hand—to make it excellent of its
kind” and this manifested itself as the infusion of beauty into all goods produced (160).
This attention to aesthetics resulted in a decided move away from mechanized production
because it came to be understood that “machines could not produce works of art” (201);
thus, industrial production in Nowhere was largely supplanted by pre-capitalist
handicraft. To return to Hammond’s earlier statement, this blending of material
production with artistic expression in the labor of the skilled artisan carries with it the
“reward of creation” which makes it a pleasurable activity. This blending of art and
utility in the production of goods is one of the primary ways in which Morris’s utopia
transcends a distinction between the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom. The
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everyday production of useful objects becomes an opportunity for the individual to
express her creative human essence. As Guest learns when he stops at a shop to acquire a
tobacco pipe, goods in Nowhere are clearly marked by artistic production; the pipe given
to him by the shop girl is “pretty and gay,” “carved out of some hard wood very
elaborately, and mounted in gold sprinkled with little gems”; Guest protests that it is “too
grand for me, or for anybody but the Emperor of the World” (73). When Guest suggests
to Dick that the pipe may be “too valuable for its use,” the latter does not understand him
(81); in Nowhere, aesthetically-motivated production is the norm, so the idea of any
useful object being “too grand” for its use (or its user) is a foreign concept.
While much attention has been given to the role of handicraft in Morris’s utopia,
and this blending of art and utility is one of the primary ways in which the worker of
Nowhere is united with her creative human essence, it is not only in the skilled
production of beautiful goods that the worker finds individual fulfillment in labor. As was
seen with the workers Guest encounters on the road, necessary physical labor whose end
goal is not an aesthetic object is also considered a pleasurable and fulfilling task. Guest’s
journey with Dick, while an opportunity for the stranger to learn of the society in which
he finds himself, also has a tangible end-goal: Dick is taking Guest upriver to a hayharvesting in which he has promised to participate. Hay-harvesting in Nowhere is
considered a “festival,” a great social event that brings with it much merriment. Guest
learns that the prospect of doing such “easy-hard work” is appealing to the inhabitants of
Nowhere; as Dick explains, “easy-hard work” is the type of labor that “tries the muscles
and hardens them and sends you pleasantly weary to bed, but which isn’t trying in other
ways”; such work, he says, “is always pleasant if you don’t overdo it” (195). As with the
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road mending, the hay-harvest is appreciated as a pleasant form of exercise; the very act
of physical exertion in the service of a socially useful task is itself prized. In the words of
Hammond, this form of work is a source of “sensuous pleasure” (123). It is not devalued
because it does not require mental exertion or a finely-tuned skill, but is appreciated as
one form of meaningful labor in a society in which inhabitants are encouraged to engage
in multiple productive activities: it is one facet of the full development of the individual.
Unlike physical exercise for the purpose of leisure, the physical exertion of the
inhabitants of Nowhere is itself a productive activity; the act is a sensuous pleasure, but it
is also a necessary one that results, to return to the words of Marx, in “the fashioning of
the objective.”
It must also be noted that while the labor of many of the hay-harvesters is
considered “easy-hard work,” a pleasure primarily for its physical exertion, the finer
points of agriculture are themselves considered the work of the artisan. As an old man
present at the harvest explains to Guest, at the time of the revolution, “everything in and
about the fields was done by elaborate machines used quite unintelligently by the
laborers,” but as the people began to realize the pleasure of labor, they began to want to
take intelligent control of the process once again; thus, they began to “pick up the
agricultural arts by carefully watching the way in which the machines worked” and the
older workers “managed to teach the younger ones gradually a little artisanship” (199,
my emphasis). An active turning away from agricultural machinery ensued, and the skill
and knowledge that had once been a necessary part of such tasks were regained. While I
will discuss Morris’s attitude towards machinery later in the chapter, I wish now to
highlight the way in which the sense of artistry in his utopia is not limited to the
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production of beautiful objects. The abandonment of machines because they could not
produce art means not just that they were viewed as incapable of producing properly
aesthetic objects, but that they were seen as impeding the artistry inherent in the skilled
execution of all forms of labor. In Nowhere, one need not be producing an object of
beauty to be engaged in artistic production; even the production of food, perhaps the most
basic necessity, is considered not as mundane necessary labor but as the creative
execution of the “agricultural arts.”
Many of the readers of News from Nowhere have focused on the way in which
labor is made fulfilling in Morris’s utopia through its embodiment of artistry and
sensuous pleasure. As Smith rightly notes, Morris reinvents the human relationship to
labor through his blending of artistic and necessary production, which results in a
breaking down of “the false dichotomies of the practical and the aesthetic, the utilitarian
and the poetic” (136); and, as Beaumont notes, Morris’s focus on the pleasure of
everyday tasks “effectively deconstructs the difference between work and play” (48). As
both scholars note, the organization of labor in Nowhere is notable for its ability to break
down divisions; these acts of deconstruction, the collapsing of the dichotomies utility/art
and work/play, are important components of what I am arguing is Morris’s larger project:
the blending of necessary and free production. Necessary labor, in Morris’s utopia, is
capable of carrying with it both the enjoyment of artistic expression and the pleasure of
play; thus, it is not merely the performance of a duty, but a free exercise of the human
powers that contributes to the full development of the individual. It is easy to see how, in
Marx’s terms, material production becomes united with the “life-activity” of the worker.
However, Morris’s utopia does not consist solely of labor that is pleasurable for its
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artistic expression or its sensual enjoyment. As Hammond tells Guest, “all work is now
pleasurable,” and while this is primarily because most work is done by “artists” and there
is “conscious sensuous pleasure” in the work itself, this is not the only way in which
work becomes free activity for the inhabitants of Nowhere: labor can also be made
pleasurable by “the hope of gain in honour and wealth with which the work is done,
which causes pleasurable excitement, even when the actual work is not pleasant” or
“because it has grown into a pleasurable habit, as in the case with what you may call
mechanical work” (122-3). Critics have often overlooked these two forms of labor in
Morris’s utopia, and they warrant further examination; it is, in part, through this more
comprehensive understanding of labor as presented by Hammond that Morris moves
beyond, to return to the words of Smith, a mere “nostalgic aestheticism.”
To consider firstly Hammond’s claim that labor is made pleasurable through the
“hope of gain in honour and wealth,” it must be realized that “wealth” in Morris’s utopia
can mean nothing other than a contribution to the social accumulation of useful products.
Dick’s inability to understand Guest’s suggestion that the ornate tobacco pipe might be
“too valuable for its use” points to the fact that there is no value in Morris’s utopia other
than the direct utility of the object. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, Bellamy
employs exchange-value for the purpose of regulating production, but in Nowhere,
exchange-value has been wholly eradicated. Thus, an accumulation of goods cannot be
transformed into monetary wealth. Furthermore, as Guest notes, the “sacred rights of
property” are no longer a structuring element of society in Nowhere (91); as Hammond
explains further, private property laws were abolished along with class: once everyone
had equal access to both the means of production and the goods produced thereby, it
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became “easy for us to live without robbing each other” (112). The attitude towards
private property in Nowhere is perhaps best expressed by the shop girl who sells Guest
his pipe: when Guest expresses his fear of losing such a fine object, she replies simply,
“What will it matter if you do? Somebody is sure to find it, and he will use it, and you
can get another” (74). Because goods are only appreciated for their immediate utility,
once that a pipe loses its utility for Guest (i.e. he loses it), it will simply assume a utility
for someone else. Thus, wealth in Morris’s utopia, as in Bellamy’s, means the production
of useful objects which are considered more collective than private in nature. Because
there is no value outside of the properties of the object itself, the individual accumulation
of goods would become, in the words of Bellamy’s Leete, “merely burdensome the
moment they exceed what adds to real comfort” (69). The pleasure derived from the
production of wealth in Morris’s utopia must thus be understood in terms of Hammond’s
assertion that “the reward of labour is life;” the production of wealth means the creation
of the material conditions of existence, the creation of all things, as Morris says
elsewhere, that “serve the pleasure of the people” (“Useful Work” 291).
What, then, of the gain of honor through labor to which Hammond refers? This,
too, is intrinsically tied to utility, to both the production of useful objects and the
performance of useful services: work done, in other words, in the service of a collective
good. As Beaumont correctly notes, in Nowhere, “all work is useful” (43). What needs to
be understood is the way in which this attention to usefulness is, for Morris, largely
lacking in the capitalist society against which he poses his alternative vision of life and
how the centrality of usefulness is an important part of the way in which work is reunited
with life-activity in News from Nowhere. In his essay “Useful Work Versus Useless
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Toil,” Morris argues that much of the work performed under the capitalist system is
devoid of usefulness because it is performed by those who are not concerned with the
“production of utilities” but instead “spend their lives and energies in fighting amongst
themselves for the respective shares of the wealth” which others produce (290). In other
words, while these individuals perform what is considered work in a capitalist society,
the goal of their activity is not production itself. Morris here speaks primarily of those
who are involved in manufacturing and commercial endeavors, those who own the means
of production and those who are responsible for the distribution of the goods produced.
Here we see a parallel to Marx, who establishes in Capital Volume One that those who
control the means of production are concerned with the production of use-values only in
as much as they lead to an increase in their personal store of capital: “Use-values are
produced by capitalists only because and in so far as they form the material sub-stratum
of exchange-value, are the bearers of exchange-value” (293). The goal of the commercial
worker, as Marx establishes in Volume Three, is to aid the industrial capitalist in the
process of valorization, to help him in his exploitation of the surplus-value produced by
the workers (407). In addition to the members of the capitalist economy who directly
benefit from the exploitation of productive labor for profit, Morris also speaks of the
wage-workers who are “engaged in the service of the private war for wealth,” the clerks
and assistants and those engaged in “competitive salesmanship,” otherwise known as “the
puffery of wares” (291). For Morris, these are all jobs which qualify as “useless toil”
because they do not contribute to the real wealth of society, which includes for Morris not
just tangible objects, but also the “storing up of knowledge of all kinds, and the power of
disseminating it” (291). Thus, one need not be engaged in material production to be
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employed usefully, but one must contribute to the betterment of society. Because
capitalist production is concerned primarily with the creation of profit, it relegates a large
portion of workers to the meeting of this goal and thus deprives them of engagement in
truly productive labor. Again this parallels Marx, who notes that the capitalist mode of
production creates “a vast number of functions at present indispensable, but in themselves
superfluous” (CV.1 667, my emphasis). The elimination of these employments which are
“superfluous” once the “production of utilities” becomes the only goal of labor is one of
the primary focuses of Morris’s utopian vision.
For Morris, the usefulness of labor, its ability to contribute to the real wealth of
society, is central to the elimination of alienated labor; as he goes on to say in “Useful
Work,” “The first step towards making labour attractive is to get the means of making
labour fruitful, the Capital, including the land, machinery, factories, etc., into the hands of
the community, to be used for the good of all alike, so that we might all work at
‘supplying’ the real ‘demands’ of each and all—that it to say, work for livelihood, instead
of working to supply the demand of the profit market” (298). To return once again to
Hammond’s claim, the “reward of labour is life,” so for labor to carry with it this reward,
it must contribute to the real conditions of existence, not the abstract realm of monetary
gain. How, then, does this meeting of the “real demands” of society translate, for Morris,
into the “hope of honour”? As he explains in “Useful Work,” labor in the service of
meeting social needs carries with it “the consciousness of benefiting ourselves and our
neighbors,” which can be “counted on in sweetening tasks otherwise irksome, since
social morality, the responsibility of man towards the life of man, will, in the new order
of things, take the place of theological morality, or the responsibility of man to some
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abstract idea” (299). In Morris’s utopia, his representation of the “new order of things,”
necessary labor carries with it the satisfaction derived from a humanist desire to improve
the conditions of social life. This desire transforms the act of labor: it is not simply that
the work is performed as a necessary duty that, despite its desirable outcome, remains a
burden, but that the very sense of the work’s importance makes the act of labor itself a
pleasurable activity. Morris goes on to make the connection between utility and honor
clear, noting that “rougher work” otherwise burdensome can be made attractive to the
worker “by the sense of special or peculiar usefulness (and therefore honour) in the mind
of the man who performs it freely” (305, my emphasis). In Morris’s conception of labor,
utility is equated with honor, and this sense of honor, which imbues necessary tasks with
meaning, creates a connection between the worker as humanist and the labor he performs
in the service of humanity.
As I noted in the previous chapter, this sense of honor also underlies necessary
labor in Bellamy’s utopia. Because Bellamy’s workers understand their labor as social
activity and themselves as social beings, intrinsically connected to the social whole, they
are driven by a “passion for humanity” that “animates” them with “the ardor of selfdevotion” (56-7). However, as I argued, the potential for socially necessary work to
promote individual fulfillment is compromised by Bellamy’s insistence on a separation
between material production performed in the realm of necessity and individual growth
carried out in the realm of freedom. Morris, in his equally unequivocal insistence that no
such divide exists, realizes the potential inherent in Bellamy’s understanding of the
worker as social being. In Bellamy’s conception, while the sense of honor derived from
performing socially necessary work adds a dimension of meaning, and by extension
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attractiveness, to the act of labor, he still understands this labor to be separated from the
free development of the individual. Because Morris realizes individual fulfillment as
intrinsically tied to necessary production, the satisfaction derived from the meeting of
social needs becomes just another way, in addition to artistic expression and sensuous
pleasure, that the individual expresses her human essence through labor.
As I have shown, Morris’s utopia showcases an active turning away from
mechanized production; after the “Great Change,” “machine after machine was quietly
dropped under the excuse that the machines could not produce works of art, and that
works of art were more and more called for” (201). As I have also discussed, this turning
away from mechanized production in favor of skilled handicraft extends to every type of
production, even that of the most basic necessities, such as food. However, machines
have not been altogether eliminated in Nowhere; furthermore, as Hammond suggests,
“mechanical work” can still hold pleasure for the laborer “because it has grown into a
pleasurable habit” (122). In a recent article, R. Jayne Hildebrand has convincingly argued
that News from Nowhere positions habit as “a behavioural substrate for the support of
creativity and adaptability” (16). For Hildebrand, Morris combats the nineteenth (and
arguably twenty-first) century notion that habit is oppositional to “aesthetic
consciousness” (11). She notes that, in Nowhere, it is only after the worker has achieved
“deftness” in his task that he can begin to express his artistry: “[T]he habituated dexterity
of Nowhere’s labourers support their aptitude for infinitely complex and varied kinds of
labour, much in the same way a jazz musician’s habitual familiarity with jazz scales
enables unthinkably complex and beautiful improvisations upon them” (17). As opposed
to life under the capitalist system, in which the increased efficiency of the worker is
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exploited for the “maximization of production,” the habitually-formed skill of the worker
in Nowhere “unleashes the expression of aesthetic exuberance in the work process” (17).
While Hildebrand’s reading does much towards understanding the role of habit as
it lends itself to the type of artistic handicraft with which Morris is so often associated, it
must also be understood that not all habitual work in Nowhere leads to a more complex
form of aesthetic production. When Hammond speaks of the pleasure to be derived from
“mechanical work,” he does not speak of habitual action as the foundation of a
pleasurable activity but of the habitual act as a source of pleasure in itself. It should be
noted that what Hammond means by “mechanical work” does not necessarily imply
actual mechanization; it could refer to work that is merely mechanical in nature, i.e. work
that is done by hand but with repeated, precise actions, any work, in other words, that
lends itself well to habitual motion. However, Morris makes clear that the role of
mechanization in his utopia is the carrying out of tasks that do not lend themselves to the
particular joys of handicraft: “All the work which would be irksome to do by hand is
done by vastly-improved machinery; and in all work which it is a pleasure to do by hand
machinery is done without” (127). Given that handicraft derives its importance from its
ability to allow for artistic variation (even in the case of the “agricultural arts,” which
must respond constantly to varying conditions) and the use of specialized skill, this
passage suggests that the work which is not a pleasure to be done by hand is that which
does not allow for artistic variation or require a finely-honed skill. Even in Nowhere, in
which the dichotomy of art/utility has been deconstructed, there are clearly still objects
whose production does not allow for such variance and intellectual engagement. Thus it
is that in Morris’s utopia, which has often been viewed as “one of the most backward66

looking novels of the nineteenth century” (Beaumont 35), machinery finds a place: in
keeping with the spirit of Morris’s vision, its employment is part of the makingpleasurable of labor that would otherwise be tedious. Ruth Kinna has recently argued that
in Morris’s future, “the productive capacity of machinery would be released in order to
reduce the amount of necessary labor time” (502); mechanized production is, for Morris,
“not suitable for voluntary labor” but could be used to “relieve the burden of necessary
work” (508). However, as I hope I have shown, Morris’s utopia is not concerned with the
reduction of necessary labor time; in fact, there is a fear amongst the inhabitants of
Nowhere that there will not be enough useful work for everyone in the future (122).
Furthermore, there is no such thing as labor that is not voluntary in Nowhere: all labor is
undertaken for the purpose of individual fulfillment as well as the meeting of societal
needs. Machinery can therefore not be said to reduce the amount of necessary labor in
Nowhere; instead, it is responsible for the transformation of otherwise tedious work into a
“pleasurable habit.” In other words, it is another way in which labor in Morris’s utopia is
removed from the realm of alienation: to return to the words of Marx, labor that might
otherwise have caused the individual to deny himself in his work, to feel “miserable and
not happy,” becomes another means to express his “active species-life.”
As I have noted in the previous chapter, the “full and free development” of the
individual, which would, for Marx, form the “ruling principle” of any “higher form of
society” is predicated on the turning of the worker from a “one-sided implement” of
capitalist production into a being that is capable of exercising a variety of human powers
(CV. 1 739,458). Bellamy seeks to accomplish this through his attention to the full
education of every individual and his shortening of the time spent on material production;
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the citizens of Bellamy’s utopia have both the knowledge and the “free time” to engage
in a variety of employments that allow for the exercise of their intellectual and artistic
faculties. Furthermore, within the realm of material production itself, Bellamy has
allowed for the individual to become fully-developed within his trade; no worker is left
unskilled. However, as I have shown, because of his separation between socially
necessary labor and the truly free activity of the individual, Bellamy has undervalued the
realm of material production and, as such, much of the labor performed in his utopia is
seen primarily as a means to an end: it is seen “not as the satisfaction of a need but as a
mere means to satisfy needs outside itself” (Manuscripts 326). While, as I have argued,
the Marx of Capital did not intend for the “realm of necessity” to include all material
production, the practical outcome of an attempt to define such a realm leads to the
conditions of Bellamy’s utopia, in which the “full and free development” of the
individual is divorced from her daily labor. In Morris’s utopia, on the other hand, in
which there is no distinction between the realm of freedom and the realm of necessity,
every act of labor contributes to the development of the individual as a creative speciesbeing. There is no separation between the means and the ends of labor: the fulfillment of
societal needs acts simultaneously as the means by which the individual fully realizes the
vast array of her human powers. Guest summarizes the role of labor in Nowhere
eloquently: “I looked, and wondered indeed, at the deftness and abundance of beauty of
the work of men who had at last learned to accept life itself as a pleasure, and the
satisfaction of the common needs of mankind and the preparation for them, as work fit
for the best of the race” (201). Morris’s equation of “life itself” with the “satisfaction of
the common needs of mankind” is the key to the elimination of alienated labor in
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Morris’s utopia: his utopia accomplishes what Marx terms in The German Ideology “the
transformation of labour into self-activity” (97). In Nowhere, the creation of the material
conditions of life and life itself are one in the same.
The parallel between News from Nowhere and The German Ideology also holds
the key to understanding how the practical application of Marx’s early philosophy of
labor is carried out in the organization of work in Morris’s utopia. In the German
Ideology, we get what Eagleton has called one of Marx’s “few frankly utopian
speculations” (24):
[A]s soon as the division of labour comes into being, each man has a
particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from
which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a
critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of
livelihood; whereas in a communist society, where nobody has one
exclusive sphere of activity, but each can become accomplished in any
branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes
it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in
the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after
dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman,
shepherd or critic. (53)
This image of life beyond capitalist production has often been derided for its utopian
quality, for the impossibility of its actualization, and it has been suggested that even Marx
himself did not take this vision seriously. In addition to claiming that the eradication of
the division of labor as Marx imagines it here is “plainly not reasonable,” Renzo Llorente
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expresses his belief that this view is not “plausibly attributable” to Marx, especially “if
one takes into account his later writings” (238). While Llorente does not go on to explain
why Marx would include this vision in his writings were it one he did not support,
Beilharz suggests that this “playful image” was merely Marx’s attempt at a “paraphrase
of” or “pun upon” Fourier’s utopian vision (598-9). I wish to argue, however, that this
image is not merely a playful one (though one cannot deny the humorous tone in phrases
like “critical critic”) but is a practical extension of the philosophy of labor present in
Marx’s early works. In a society in which labor is not separated from self- activity, in
which “necessary” work time in the social realm is not divided from “free” time in the
individual realm, the life of the individual is expressed through her socialized production.
Thus, “the development of individuals into complete individuals” becomes equivalent
with engagement in various productive employments (GI 97). When labor is a
fundamental aspect of life, the fullness of one’s life depends upon the variety of one’s
labors. This understanding structures both the brief vision of labor in a post-capitalist
society as put forth here by Marx, as well as the extended vision brought into being by
Morris’s utopia. In Nowhere, every individual actively pursues a variety of productive
activities which vary along the spectrums of artistic to pragmatic, mental to physical, and
varied to routine. Morris recognizes that none of these activities, taken alone, would
result in the full development of the individual. Unlike Bellamy’s utopia, in which the
individual is expected to realize her full development outside the realm of socially
necessary labor, the individual in Nowhere embraces the full scope of her human powers
as she contributes to the needs of society. Thus, the underlying philosophy that it is only
through the active creation of her material world that the individual expresses her
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species-being becomes practically expressed in Morris’s utopia as the need to allow every
individual to engage in a variety of pursuits, all of which are considered a useful
contribution to the betterment of society.
Both Morris’s utopia and the above passage from The German Ideology have
been understood as largely pastoral; indeed, the glorification of the hay-harvest which
forms the culmination of Guest’s journey is distinctly Georgian, and the activities Marx
chooses to highlight in his vision of the communist future are all, with the exception of
criticism, rural in nature. However, while Morris’s utopian vision, with its active
rejection of most mechanized production, can be rightly read as largely anti-industrial,
Marx, even in the early works, cannot be understood as such. It is in their respective
views on large-scale, mechanized production that Morris and Marx most dramatically
diverge. While Bellamy is distinguished from Marx for his unwillingness to embrace
revolutionary political change, Morris was an ardent believer in the necessity of political
revolution. News from Nowhere contains a brilliantly detailed recounting of the
protracted class war that gave birth to the “Great Change.” In this way, critics such as
Raymond Williams are correct in their assertion that socialist visions like Bellamy’s must
be “radically distinguished from the revolutionary socialism of Morris and Marx” (60).
However, as I argued in the previous chapter, Marx’s vision of the transition from
capitalism to socialism is not one of complete rupture: the socialist future must be built
on the material foundations of capitalism. Morris, in his zealousness to wholly
reconstruct the role of labor in his future society, abandons these material foundations,
arguably to the detriment of the viability of his vision. As Hammond tells Guest, the great
civil war which ended capitalism contained a level of destruction never before seen, both
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of already produced “wares” and, more significantly, of “the instruments for making
them” (157). While the previous owners of the means of production, once they saw that
they were going to lose control, had no incentive to protect them, the “rebels” were
equally unconcerned; in fact, the latter viewed the existing material structures as one with
the social relations they were attempting to supplant and thus welcomed their destruction.
This mindset was embodied in a common saying at the time: “Let the country be cleared
of everything except valiant living men, rather than we fall into slavery again!” (157).
Thus, Morris’s utopian future begins with a virtually clean slate, and of the machinery
that survives the revolution, much of it is actively phased out in the beginnings days of
the new civilization. One of the first things Guest notices is the absence of factories along
the Thames, and Dick later explains to him that while there are structures somewhat like
factories, they are now called “Banded-workshops” and are for the performance of
“hand-work in which working together is necessary or convenient” (81). While
Hammond attests to the presence of “immensely improved machinery,” he also makes
clear that it is only employed when the task is not pleasurable to be performed by hand.
While some labor may be performed with the aid of machinery, and there are often small
groups of laborers who band together for the completion of tasks, the vast collective
“social powers of production” which Marx saw as the fruitful legacy of capitalism are
noticeably absent (CV. 3 375).
In fact, Hammond tells Guest that, in Nowhere, “we discourage centralization all
we can” (101), and Morris’s utopian vision holds true to this maxim. While this
discouraging of centralization affects many aspects of life in Nowhere, I am particularly
interested in how it influences the organization of labor, namely, how it leads to a lack of
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organization in both production and distribution. When Dick chooses to leave his
employment as a boatman to accompany Guest as his guide, he simply finds a friend to
take his place. Laborers in Nowhere seemingly move freely from employment to
employment; it is self-direction which primarily structures production and the carrying
out of necessary services. Tasks that require collective labor, such as the hay-harvest, are
organized through an informal network of neighborly aid: Dick tells Guest that he has
“promised to go up-stream to some special friends of mine, for the hay-harvest” (51).
Hammond tells Guest that while there is obviously no “individual exchange,” there are
“regulations of the markets” carried out by those “whose delight is in administration and
organization, to use long-tailed words; I mean people who like keeping things together,
avoiding waste, seeing that nothing sticks fast uselessly” (116). However, as Darko Suvin
has rightly noted, there is no indication of such organizational structures in Morris’s
utopia: Morris’s vision embodies “a total refusal to envisage any machinery,
technological or societal. This amounts to leaving the future society without any
economic or organizational basis” (81). While I have noted that there is some usage of
technology in Nowhere, Suvin’s argument is still a valid one: Morris’s commitment to
radically breaking with industrial capitalism leads him to abandon economic structures all
together.
In Marx’s terms, Morris’s utopia marks a return to the pre-capitalist conditions of
small-scale production and privatized labor. In Capital Volume One, Marx speaks of “a
new productive power, which is intrinsically a collective one” which arises from
capitalist production; it is through these collective acts of large-scale production that the
worker “strips off the fetters of his individuality, and develops the capabilities of his
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species” (447). While the worker under the capitalist system cannot recognize the
potential of this collective power because it is imposed upon him as an outside force, this
socialized production, when brought under the control of the workers, is the key to the
creation of society in which the individual can truly develop as a species-being. Smallscale production, on the other hand, “[a]s it excludes the concentration of these means of
production, so it also excludes co-operation, […] the social control and regulation of the
forces of nature, and the free development of the productive forces of society” (927-8).
For Marx, then, Morris’s return to small-scale production in his post-capitalist future
would constitute an abandonment of human potential. While Morris’s laborers do work
together on a small scale in a cooperative manner, and all work contributes to the needs
(material and otherwise) of society, they are not a socialized productive force in the way
that Marx imagines; far from being a “comprehensive organization” of “scientificallyarranged processes of production” (780), the workforce of Nowhere is a loose collection
of individuals who have no structural means of regulating their productive powers.
It is undoubtedly Morris’s commitment to the transformation of labor as lifeactivity that motivates his desire to move away from centralized production. He critiques
Looking Backward for what appears to him as a coercive system of labor; he questions
Bellamy’s assertion that labor is freely undertaken in his “tightly drilled” army (356). For
Morris, the systematic organization of labor as Bellamy presents it becomes unnecessary
when “the true incentive to useful and happy labour is […] pleasure in the work itself”
(357). However, as I have argued in the last chapter, Bellamy’s “industrial army” is not
established for the purpose of coercion; it is the means by which Bellamy’s society
harnesses the collective power of its socialized productive force for the meeting of social
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needs. The “industrial army” does not represent forced labor, but the organization of
voluntary labor. In the absence of these organizational structures, labor in Morris’s utopia
cannot be coordinated beyond the interaction of workers who come into direct contact
with one another. Morris was also largely unconcerned with efficiency of production; he
believed that once incentives to produce for the purpose of profit had been removed, once
production was focused on the meeting of “real demands,” things actually useful to
society, the meeting of these demands would be easily accomplished. As I have noted,
the inhabitants of Nowhere are so completely satisfying these demands that they fear they
will run out of useful work. Just as efficiency need not be a factor in the meeting of
societal needs, there is also no need, for Morris, to reduce the amount of labor time spent
in production because of his vision of useful labor as fundamental life-activity. Because
meeting the material needs of society is not something that must be accomplished before
life can begin, because labor is not a burden but the primary pleasure of life, the reduction
of labor time for the betterment of life is an irrelevant concept. Thus, we return to
Morris’s criticism of Bellamy, that “his only idea for making labour tolerable is to
decrease the amount of it by means of fresh and ever fresh developments of machinery”
(357). It is true that, for Bellamy, the productive efficiency of his society is carried out in
service of the creation of more “free” time for the individual to explore her full
development outside the realm of material production. This is also the case with the Marx
of Capital, who sees the social benefit of mechanized large-scale production as a “greater
reduction in the overall time devoted to material labour” (V.3 958). Because, for Bellamy
and the later Marx, the realm of freedom exists outside the realm of necessity, the
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reduction of time spent in service of the latter means more time for the individual to fully
express herself in the former.
As I have argued, Morris’s ability to break down the barrier between necessary
and free production is an essential component of moving beyond the alienation of labor
as experienced by the worker in the capitalist system. However, his utopia is limited by
its confidence that self-directed, small-scale production could meet the needs of society.
While Morris equates productive efficiency with a devaluing of necessary labor, there
arguably cannot be a modern society that can meet the needs of its citizens without a
highly-organized, efficient labor force. Is there, then, a way in which a necessary
efficiency of production can accommodate an understanding of labor as life-activity? Or
does large-scale socialized production intrinsically entail a division between the realm of
necessity and the realm of freedom? The final section of this thesis will be dedicated to
the answering of these questions.
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CONCLUSION
While Looking Backward and News from Nowhere are often read as oppositional,
Darko Suvin, in his classic Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, makes an eloquent
argument for the way in which these two texts might be the “perfect complement” to one
another:
Staying within the bourgeois—or indeed WASP—existentialist horizons,
Bellamy had pursued the everyday need for security to its logical
conclusion and ended up with a socialist dawn as an order of things, a
societas rerum. Reneging on the bourgeois existential horizons but
opposing them to unrealistically idealized—indeed bohemian—horizons,
Morris pursued the arrested timeless moment, the visionary dream […] of
Earthly Paradise to its logical conclusion and ended up with another aspect
of that same dawn: creative and therefore beautiful human relations, a
societas hominum. Between them, they covered the technical premises and
the sensual horizons of that dawn: each lacks what the other has. (185, my
emphasis)
In Suvin’s conception, Bellamy provides the material structures and Morris the human
conditions for a complete socialist vision that presents a holistic alternative to life in a
capitalist society. My reading of the role of labor in these two texts fits, in significant
ways, into this paradigm put forth by Suvin. While Morris transcends alienation in his
understanding of labor as fundamental to the development of the individual as a creative
being, his unwillingness to employ the collective power of centralized production leaves
his utopia without the support of a material foundation. While Bellamy provides these
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material foundations through the harnessing of a centralized system of production to the
equal benefit of all his citizens, his understanding that true human development happens
only outside the realm of material production limits his ability to move beyond alienation.
In this way, each lacks what the other provides. Can we then, following Suvin’s pattern,
graft Morris’s philosophy of labor onto the economic structures of Bellamy’s utopia? If
so, what might it look like?
While Suvin imagines Bellamy’s utopia as a “society of things,” the latter’s vision
is not simply a materialistic one. His material conditions of production are structured by a
humanist philosophy: like Morris, his end goal is a society in which every individual
would be free to develop a full range of human capacities. Because, for Bellamy, material
comfort is the precondition for this development, his focus on efficient production is
intrinsically tied to this goal. The highly-regulated system of labor he imagines is
designed to reduce the amount of time spent by each individual in the meeting of social
needs to allow for her growth outside of this realm. While Morris holds the same
humanistic goal, his belief that the individual can realize her human potential only
through the active creation of her material world makes his means of achieving this end
radically different. Therefore, any attempt to imagine a combination of the two socialist
visions must contend with this fundamental philosophical difference. However, despite
this rift, both thinkers open up possibilities in their respective utopias to allow for a
merging of the two worlds.
As I have argued, Bellamy’s utopia already significantly overcomes many aspects
of the alienation created by capitalist labor relations. Bellamy’s creation of a society
structured around mutual interdependence and the voluntary participation of each
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individual in the meeting of social needs radically breaks with the competitive
individualism which underlies capitalist production. There is also much potential for the
workers in Bellamy’s society to feel that they are expressing their humanity in the labor
they perform: because they realize themselves as an intrinsic part of a unified social
whole, acts of labor in the service of social needs become an expression of their
essentially social being. Further, the matching of workers with employments for which
they feel they are best suited, as well as the encouragement that each individual become
skilled in his trade, act as additional means through which the worker can achieve selffulfillment in his labor time. However, because Bellamy still realizes necessary
production as primarily a duty to be performed before life can begin, he is not concerned
with integrating the full development of the individual with her acts of production. This is
where Suvin’s conception of the complementary nature of the two utopias becomes
problematic in application. Bellamy’s worker devotes his life to one trade; while the
skilled nature of his labor makes him more than a “one-sided implement,” he is still
limited in the scope of his productive activities. In Bellamy’s conception, one serves the
nation either with “hands” or “brains” (42). While this distinction between physical and
mental labor is certainly not as definitive in Bellamy’s utopia as his language suggests, a
practical divide still exists between those who engage in primarily manual labor and
those who engage in intellectual or artistic work. For Morris, the relegation of an
individual to one type of labor would compromise the entire philosophical basis of his
utopian vision. Because, in Morris’s conception, labor is life-activity, the development of
the individual is intrinsically tied to the way in which she contributes to the needs of
society; thus, in order to be a fully developed human being, to express her full range of
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human capacities, she must be engaged in a variety of useful productive activities. The
question then becomes: Can Bellamy’s highly regulated system of labor allow for the
variance of productive activity that Morris imagines as essential? The answer, I believe,
is yes. Morris’s system is predicated on individuals, without any structural guidance,
determining social needs and meeting them through purely individual initiative. While
this works in Morris’s small communities, this is not a feasible system on a large scale.
Bellamy’s centralized organizational structure, which determines social demands and
regulates production accordingly, does not disallow the engagement of the individual in
multiple employments throughout his life. Bellamy’s extended, holistic educational
period already provides the individual with an arsenal of skills and knowledge; instead of
assuming that the individual will chose one employment for which they are best suited,
and then employ the rest of that skill and knowledge in their “free” time, a system can be
imagined that would allow the individual to integrate more of this holistic education into
her work through the selection of three or four employments that span a range of labor
types. The existence of Morris’s weaver/mathematician, for instance, could just as easily
find a place in Bellamy’s socially-regulated labor force as in Morris’s wholly selfdirected one.
Another problem that must be addressed in the merging of the two visions is the
question of machinery: since Morris actively moves away from machine production in
favor of handicraft, is this an intrinsic part of his labor philosophy that would clash with
Bellamy’s reliance on industrial production? While Morris would likely not approve of
the type of mass production that Bellamy imagines, it is not wholly incompatible with his
understanding of labor as life-activity. While he was skeptical of an overreliance on
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mechanized production, Morris does not preclude this type of labor from contributing to
the full development of the individual. While mechanical labor does not allow for the
kind of creative variance that Morris undoubtedly favors, he argues that it can still
become self-fulfilling both through the intrinsic pleasure of habitual activity as well as in
the broader sense in which all useful labor is tied to self-fulfillment: through the sense of
honor that arises in the individual who is contributing, as a social being intrinsically
connected to her fellows, in a meaningful way to social existence. Thus, the efficiency of
production in the meeting of social needs which industrial production allows need not be
sacrificed in the service of eradicating alienated labor. As long as the individual can
engage in a variety of productive activities, both within a particular trade and amongst
various types of professions, mechanized labor can become one avenue for the
individual’s full and free development.
In The German Ideology, Marx argues that in a capitalist system, the existing
socialized productive force of which the worker is an active part appears instead as
something external to her; thus, she is alienated from her labor, which in reality unites her
with these forces, because her own productive activity feels external to her: it loses “all
semblance of life-activity” (96). The only way, then, in which the worker’s labor can
become life-activity is through the unification of the worker with the means of
production, and it is through this unification that she explores the full range of her human
development: “The appropriation of these [productive] forces is itself nothing more than
the development of the individual capacities corresponding to the material instruments of
production. The appropriation of a totality of instruments of production is, for this very
reason, the development of a totality of capacities in the individual’s themselves” (96). In
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this text, Marx imagines that the appropriation by the workers of the vast and varied
means of production which arise with industrial capitalism is equivalent to the full
expression of their human capacities. In uniting her productive activity with a wide range
of material instruments of production, her productive activity becomes just as varied.
Because she is now expressing her full range of human capacities through her labor, her
labor is no longer external to her self-fulfilling development; this results, for Marx, in
“the transformation of labor into self-activity” (97, my emphasis). This, I believe, is the
potential inherent in a merging of the utopian visions of Bellamy and Morris: the
employment of all the material productive forces of capitalism by a collective labor force
comprised of individuals who view their labor, not as a necessary burden to be overcome
before life can begin, but as a means to fully develop their human capacities.
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